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The demand for access to the electromagnetic
spectrum has grown dramatically in the last 15
years.' This has occurred because of the dynamic
proliferation of wireless communications technol-
ogies and consumer demand for services related
to these technologies. 2 For instance, the number
of mobile telephony service subscribers in the
United States has grown from more than 90,000
in January 1985 to more than 86 million at the
end of 1999 (approximately 32% of the U.S. pop-
I The electromagnetic spectrum is the range of electro-
magnetic radiation in our world. Electromagnetic radiation
is "energy that radiates from all things in nature and from
man-made electronic systems. It includes cosmic rays, gamma
rays, x-rays, ultraviolet light, visible light, infrared light, radar,
microwaves, TV, radio, cell phones and all electronic trans-
mission systems." TECHENCYCLOPEDIA, Electromagnetic Radia-
tion, at http://www.techweb.com/encyclopedia/printDefini-
tion?term=electromagnetic%20radiation (last visited Mar. 11,
2001).
2 See In re Principles for Promoting the Efficient Use of
Spectrum by Encouraging the Development of Secondary
Markets, Policy Statement, 15 FCC Rcd. 24,178, 24,179, para. 3
(2000) [hereinafter Secondary Markets Policy Statement].
3 See id. at 24,179, para. 4.
4 Id. (noting that an increase in wireless subscribership
has resulted in an accompanying increase in wireless usage);
see CELLULAR TEL. & INTERNET ASSOC., FOR THE CONSUMER:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS & FAST FACTS, at http://
www.wow-com.com/consumer/faq/ (last visited Apr. 21,
2001) (stating that there are currently more than 112 million
U.S. wireless subscribers, with estimates of 45,924 new sub-
scribers or one every two seconds in the U.S.) (citing expert
estimates that by 2005 there will be more than 1.26 billion
wireless phone users globally).
5 As of December 2000, U.S. wireless service providers di-
rectly employ almost 185,000 people and have made almost $
90 billion in cumulative capital investment. See CELLULAR
TEL. & INTERNET ASSOC. 3, SEMI-ANNUAL WIRELESS INDUSTRY
SURVEY, available at http://www.wow-com.com/pdf/wire-
less-survey_2000.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2001); see also Dale
N. Hatfield, Perspectives on the Next Generation of Communica-
tions, Keynote Address at the Opening Plenary Session of the Vehicu-
lar Technology Conference Fall 2000, at http://www.fcc.gov/oet/
ulation) .3 These numbers are only expected to in-
crease. 4 This wireless explosion has also been a
major engine of growth in both the American and
global economies. 5
However, as the demand for new services rises
(especially spectrum-hungry mobile data services)
the spectrum available to accommodate the new
technologies diminishes. 6 The problem is com-
pounded by the fact that there is simply no new
spectrum to be allocated. 7 In order to free up
spectrum, the Federal Communications Commis-
smsi/Welcome.html (Sept. 26, 2000) [hereinafter Hatfield]
(noting that economists have attributed efficiency gains pri-
marily responsible for the economic prosperity of the last
decade to the Internet and e-commerce, and that extending
high-speed Internet services to mobile devices will continue
such productivity gains); William E. Kennard, Wire Less is
More, Address to the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Associa-
tion (currently the Cellular Telecommunications & Internet
Association), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Ken-
nard/ (Feb. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Kennard] (noting that
spectrum is the "life-blood" of the wireless industry and that
the wireless industry cannot grow without it).
6 See TECH LAvWJOURNAL, FCC DISCUSSES SECONDARY MAR-
KETS FOR WIRELESS SPECTRUM, TECH. L.J., Jan. 16, 2001, at
http://techlawjournal.com/telecom/20001110a.asp (Nov.
10, 2000) (quoting former FCC Chairman William Kennard
saying "that spectrum scarcity is the most serious challenge
facing the wireless industry today and ... [d]emand for spec-
trum is outstripping supply.") (noting that Kennard reflected
that the problem will only intensify as demand for wireless
Internet access grows); see also Secondary Markets Policy State-
ment, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,179, para. 5 (citing analyst estimates
that wireless data subscribership will reach 100 million by
2007, and that wireless data subscribers will outnumber wire-
line data subscribers by 2002).
7 Almost all the spectrum in the United States, especially
the more sought after bands below 3 GHz, has already been
allocated for various services. Thus, there is little available
spectrum for new services. Id. at 24,180, para. 7; see Harold
Furchtgott-Roth, The Only Solution Is Evolution, RCR WIRELESS
NEWS, Oct. 30, 2000, at 14, 14 [hereinafter Furchtgott-Roth]
("While other countries may be in a position to dedicate wide
swaths of unused spectrum to a particular new technology,
the United States has already allocated practically all of the
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sion (the "FCC" or "Commission") has made sev-
eral attempts to manage the spectrum efficiently
by recognizing the introduction of market forces
as a means of ensuring that spectrum is put to its
highest valued and most efficient use.8 The assign-
ment of spectrum by competitive bidding (or auc-
tions) has proven to be one of the most successful
means of ensuring that the spectrum is being
used most efficiently.9 Yet, as a primary market or
transaction, auctions generally only secure an ini-
tial efficiency. l
In an effort to realize efficiencies after the ini-
tial assignment (i.e,.post-auction), the FCC has in-
itiated a rulemaking to facilitate the development
radio spectrum to government or commercial uses.").
8 See Secondary Markets Policy Statement, 15 FCC Rcd. at
24,180-81, para. 8 (citing the Commission's holding of en
banc hearings, issuance of prior Policy Statements, enactment
of specific rules for cellular and CMRS, and the formation of
a Technological Advisory Committee (TAC) in order develop
more flexible and efficient spectrum management policies).
9 Id. at 24,181-82, para. 10 ("The assignment of spec-
trum through competitive bidding has facilitated more effi-
cient and rapid licensing of spectrum to those who value it
the most.").
l( See Glen 0. Robinson, Spectrum Property Law 101, 41
J.L. & ECON. 609, 619-20 (1998) [hereinafter Robinson]
(noting that efficiencies realized at auctions only recognize
the best use of the spectrum at the time of the auction be-
cause changing technological and economic circumstances
may create a new highest-valued use of the spectrum after the
auction).
II The term "secondary market" is a financial term refer-
ring to a market in which an investor buys a security from an
investor rather than the original issuer, subsequent to the
original issuance in the primary market. It is also known as
an "after market" and is exemplified best by exchanges such
as the New York Stock Exchange. In the context of spectrum,
the original issuer is the FCC, and its initial assignment of the
spectrum, usually through auctions, represents the primary
market. The secondary market transaction in spectrum takes
place when the original licensee leases, temporarily or for
the long-term, or sells unused spectrum frequencies to a
third party. Campbell R. Harvey, Hypertextual Finance Glossary,
7, at http://www.duke.edu/-charvey/Classes/wpg/
bfgloss.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2001); In re Promoting Effi-
cient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to
the Development of Secondary Markets, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd. 24,203, 24,204-05, paras. 1-4
(2000) [hereinafter Secondary Markets NPRM] (stating that
the Commission opened that proceeding to effectuate the
goals and principles of the Secondary Markets Policy Statement)
(choosing the development of more complete secondary
markets to promote the efficient use of Commission-licensed
spectrum; thus, freeing up more spectrum for emerging ap-
plications).
12 See Secondary Markets Policy Statement, 15 FCC Rcd. at
24,182-83, para. 12 ("An effectively functioning system of
secondary markets would encourage licensees to be more
spectrum efficient by freely trading their rights to ... unused
frequencies.").
of secondary markets in spectrum." Secondary
markets represent opportunities to use more fully
the entire available spectrum. 12 Secondary mar-
kets in spectrum have existed for years, and they
are comprised of different arrangements.
13 Of
these arrangements, however, spectrum leasing is
the most efficient arrangement because of its flex-
ibility. 14 Spectrum leasing allows licensees to part
with unused or underused spectrum temporarily
on terms and for periods of time that licensees set
to meet their individual private or commercial
needs. 15 The best example of spectrum leasing is
the Commission's authorization of Instructional
Television Fixed Service ("ITFS") 16 licensees to
13 Current secondary markets in radio spectrum exist
primarily through assignment or transfer of control of li-
censes; however, they also exist through arrangements where
licensees do not relinquish control of the spectrum, such as
management agreements, joint marketing agreements and
resale agreements, and through partial assignments pro-
duced by disaggregating and partitioning portions of fre-
quencies. See Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at
24,208-09, para. 15. Among these mechanisms, the Commis-
sion has placed the most hope in partitioning and disaggre-
gation as means of creating secondary markets. Partitioning
occurs when a licensee divides its geographic service area
and sells a portion to another party. Similarly, disaggregation
involves the division and sale of a licensee's licensed frequen-
cies. As discussed below, these mechanisms have failed to be
successful for several reasons. See infra note 130.
14 The Commission defines a "spectrum lease" in this
proceeding as an arrangement where a licensee makes excess
spectral capacity available to another party while retaining
the license. In this arrangement, the licensee is the lessor
(the party who conveys possession of a thing under a lease),
and the other party is the lessee (the party who has posses-
sion of the thing under the lease). Secondary Markets Policy
Statement, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,178, para. 1 n.1; see RANDOM
HOUSE WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF THE LAw 266 (2000) (defin-
ing lessor and lessee, respectively); see also Comments of
Securicor Wireless Holdings, Inc. to the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 00-230, at 4 (Feb. 9, 2001) [here-
inafter Securicor Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM] (citing
spectrum leasing as the most flexible of the arrangements
comprising secondary markets in spectrum).
15 Id. at 4 ("[S]pectrum leasing makes sense to licensees
because it places spectrum that might otherwise go unused
or underutilized into use, producing more revenue for licen-
sees, while allowing licensees to maintain their core asset-
their licensed spectrum."); see Secondary Markets Policy State-
ment, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,183, para. 13 ("The lessor would real-
ize income while maintaining control of spectrum that it
might need to meet long term strategic objectives, while the
lessee would be able to make a profit by providing service to
otherwise under-served customers.").
16 The Instructional Television Fixed Service (ITFS) is
comprised of twenty television channels that the Commission
may license to educational institutions for instructional pur-
poses. NATIONAL ITFS ASSOCIATION, WHAT IS ITFS?, at http:
//www.itfs.org/articles/aboutjitfs.htm (last visited Apr. 21,
2001).
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lease excess spectral capacity to Multichannel
Multipoint Distribution Service ("MMDS") 17 oper-
ators. These arrangements have resulted in mutu-
ally beneficial relationships where MDS operators
help construct and maintain ITFS facilities in ex-
change for leased portions of ITFS underutilized
spectrum. 8
Despite the success of the ITFS/MDS and other
leasing arrangements, the development of secon-
dary markets has been slowed by cumbersome
regulations coupling the spectrum with the assets
implemented in its use; thus, it results in an un-
certainty that deters parties from entering into
leasing agreements.' 9 In an effort to correct this
regulatory barrier, the secondary markets
rulemaking attempts to liberalize the Commis-
sion's spectrum leasing rules enough to uncouple
the spectrum and its related assets to allow for the
enhanced regulatory certainty and freedom
sought.20 Given the intense concern over a poten-
tial "spectrum drought," it is likely that the Com-
mission will adopt such rules to speed the devel-
opment of secondary markets.
21
Eventually, it is hoped that secondary markets
17 The Commission established the Multipoint Distribu-
tion Service (MDS) in 1972. Originally intended to deliver
business data, MDS increasingly became used to deliver tele-
vision broadcast signals to specific subscriber households. Re-
sponding to this trend, the Commission reassigned eight
ITFS channels to MDS; thus it created the Multichannel Mul-
tipoint Distribution Service (MMDS) to provide video pro-
gramming to subscribers and acquired the name "Wireless
Cable." See MAss MEDtA BUREAU, VIDEO SERICE DIVISION, FED-
ERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, MULTIPOINT DISTRIBU-
TION SERVICE (MDS), at http://www.fcc.gov/mmb/vsd/md/
md.html (last visited June 14, 2001); see also WIIATIS?COM,
MULTICHANNEL MULTIPOINT DISTRIBUTION SERVICE, at http://
whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,289893,sid9-gci
505606,00.html (last modified Dec. 11, 2000); 47 C.F.R.
§ 74.931 (e) (2000) (authorizing ITFS operators to lease spec-
trum to MDS operators on a for-profit basis); 47 C.F.R.
§ 21.13(f) (2000) (authorizing MDS operators to lease from
ITFS operators ).
18 See Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,234-35,
para. 86 (stating that several technical rules were relaxed to
permit spectrum leasing arrangements between MDS and
ITFS licensees) (citing In re Request for Declaratory Ruling
on the Use of Digital Modulation by Multipoint Distribution
Service and Instructional Television Fixed Service Stations,
Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 19,112, 19,114, para. 4 (1998)).
19 According to Arthur DeVany the spectrum
"aftermarket is encumbered by the illiquidity created by the
bundling of spectrum with the assets that use it . . .Only
when we have unbundled spectrum and broadcasting assets
to create deep and liquid markets in spectrum bandwidth
and its derivatives will we capture the full promise of spec-
trum markets." Arthur DeVany, Implementing a Market-Based
Spectrum Policy, 41 J.L. & ECON. 627, 628 (1998) [hereinafter
will evolve into spot markets where spectrum will
be bought and sold on exchanges according to
supply and demand at that moment.2 2 Critical
new technologies, like software-defined radio, will
be needed to spur this development.23 However,
equally important to technological development
is the development of regulatory policy that facili-
tates application of these new technologies.
2 4
Rule changes may not be enough to effectuate
fully this change. As a result, the underlying statu-
tory scheme and the policies it supports must be
transformed.
This comment follows the evolution of spec-
trum policy in the context of assignments and
transfers. First, this comment provides a broad
overview of how the relationship between spec-
trum users and the spectrum license has evolved
and seen the reemergence of market forces and
competition theory in that area. Second, this com-
ment examines the statutory and regulatory stan-
dards spectrum users face when attempting to act
on market forces by entering into spectrum leas-
ing agreements. Third, this comment will analyze
the current FCC rulemaking and explain how it
DeVany] (comparing secondary markets to existing capital
markets).
20 See Secondary Markets Policy Statement, 15 FCC Rcd. at
24,184-85, para. 16 (seeking greater regulatory certainty that
will alleviate resistance to secondary market transactions).
21 See Kennard, supra note 5 ("We will head off a spec-
trum drought if we build on the successes of the past: ex-
panding on the market-based approaches of the last decade;
finding more ways to create a fluid market in spectrum.").
22 The Commission has accepted the premise that spec-
trum is a fungible good that may be used for multiple pur-
poses, and therefore, it should be traded like other commod-
ities, such as oil, gas, and pork bellies. Most importantly, the
Commission draws a parallel between potential secondary
markets in spectrum and the spot markets that have emerged
for wireline bandwidth. See Secondary Markets Policy Statement,
15 FCC Rcd. at 24,158, para. 17, (citing Sharon Crowe, Testi-
mony Before the Public Forum on Secondary Markets in Radio Spec-
trum, 49-56, available at http://www.fcc.gov/realaudio/
tr053100.pdf (May 31, 2000)) [hereinafter Public Forum].
23 As explained later in the comment, software-defined
radio and other digital communications technologies enable
spectrum to be used for a particular service in multiple fre-
quencies. As a result, spectrum users become more aware of
the spectrum's value and willing to participate in what be-
comes fluid secondary markets for spectrum. See discussion
infra Part V.A. and accompanying footnotes.
24 Aside from the proposed amendment of its other rules
to provide spectrum users with the incentive to deploy such
technologies, the Commission specifically seeks to amend its
technical rules to allow the multiple frequency use of such




aims to foster secondary markets by simplifying
the process of spectrum leasing. Fourth, this com-
ment will explain how the FCC's likely course of
action after the rulemaking will be sufficient to
foster relatively static leasing agreements, but also
will ignore potential opportunities to prepare the
regulatory environment for new and more tech-
nologically efficient spectrum applications and
markets. Finally, this comment suggests regulatory
and statutory alternatives to prepare for those
emerging technologies and markets.
II. OVERVIEW OF SPECTRUM POLICY
A. Property rights in spectrum
To understand completely the current regula-
tory movement favoring the development of
greater property rights in spectrum and secon-
dary spectrum markets, one must first consider
the evolution of spectrum policy. In doing so, it
becomes clear that the process of allocating and
assigning spectrum has changed the expectations
of spectrum users when they actually use, transfer
or exclude others from their assigned spectrum
frequencies.25
1. In the Beginning: De Facto Property Rights in
Spectrum
In the early days of radio, there was a short pe-
25 Columbia University Professor of Finance and Eco-
nomics Eli M. Noam has distinguished three "paradigm
shifts" in the history of spectrum policy (occupancy, adminis-
trative, and auction), as well as an emerging fotrth paradigm
(open access) that may again alter the way spectrum is regu-
lated. Eli Noam, Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday's Heresy, Today s
Orthodoxy, Tomorrow s Anachronism: Taking the Next Step to Open
Spectrum Access, 41J.L. & ECON. 765, 766-70 (1998) [hereinaf
ter Noam].
26 See id. at 766 (describing the early period, or "occu-
pancy paradigm" as an "electronic original state of nature").
27 47 U.S.C. § 51 (repealed 1927). The Wireless Ship Act
of 1910 was actually the first legislation to address radio by
requiring all ships carrying over 50 passengers out of a U.S.
port to have ship-to-shore radio onboard. Wireless Ship Act
of 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-262, 36 Stat. 629 (repealed 1934).
28 See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210
(1943) (noting that the Radio Act of 1912 "forbade the oper-
ation of radio apparatus without a license from the Secretary
of Commerce and Labor[,] . . . allocated certain frequencies
for the use of the Government, and imposed restrictions
upon the character of wave emissions.").
29 See id. at 210-1I (noting that because there were more
stations than frequencies available by the early 1920's, every
station in the standard broadcast channel was occupied by at
least one and, in some cases, several users); see also Noam,
riod of spectrum assignment that resembled a
frontier where the first to use or "settle" a given
frequency acquired a proprietary interest in that
frequency. 26 This phenomenon was largely unaf-
fected by the passage of the Radio Act of 1912,
which required a spectrum user to acquire a De-
partment of Commerce and Labor license before
operating.2 7 The impact of the 1912 legislation
was minimal primarily because it was silent as to
licensees' property rights over the spectrum and
their ability to transfer use of their assigned fre-
quency28 This regulatory vacuum was not a prob-
lem until technological improvements and radio's
growing popularity increased traffic over the nas-
cent medium to the point where significant inter-
ference resulted. 29 According to conventional his-
torical accounts, this interference prompted the
Secretary of Commerce and Labor to begin as-
signing and denying licenses based on interfer-
ence considerations. " '° After several legal deci-
sions declared that the Secretary of Commerce
and Labor did not have the authority to take such
action,'3 the continuing regulatory vacuum gave
way to a vortex of interfering spectrum users that
threatened the future of radio and seemed to cry
supra note 25, at 766 (explaining that the likelihood of radio
interference was high given the limited number of bands
under users' mastery and that technological advancements
were being made more in the area of radio transmission dis-
tance than the separation of signals).
'11 Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 211 (recounting that the
Secretary of Commerce and Labor first began by dividing the
spectrum into many bands, assigning specified frequencies in
those bands to particular established stations, and then at-
tempting to limit licenses to operation at certain powers and
times to enable licensees to share frequencies).
3 See Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1004-07
(D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that the Secretary of Commerce
and Labor could not deny a radio license to an applicant on
the alleged ground that it would cause interference with ex-
isting private and government stations); see also United States
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N. D. Ill. 1926) (holding
Secretary of Commerce and Labor lacked the power to im-
pose restrictions on a licensee's frequency, power, and hours
of operation, and that the use of spectrum not assigned to a
licensee did not violate the Radio Act of 1912). These deci-
sions were followed by an advisory opinion by the Attorney
General finding that the Radio Act of 1912 gave the Com-
merce and Labor Secretary no authority to regulate fre-
quency, power or hours of operation, and then the Secre-
tary's announcement that he would completely forsake
[Vol. 10
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out for a legislative solution. 32
2. The physical scarcity doctrine and the regulatory
administration of spectrum
Congress responded to the interference prob-
lem by enacting the Radio Act of 1927 which insti-
tuted the first major transition in spectrum regu-
latory policy.33 The Radio Act of 1927 [the "Radio
Act"] ushered in the basic form of governmental
administration of the spectrum that we know to-
day.3 4 The Federal Communications Act of 1934
[the "Communications Act"], which incorporated
the Radio Act's basic provisions and created the
FCC to oversee the regulation of commercial
spectrum and common carrier telephony, fol-
lowed soon after the Radio Act.35 The Communi-
cations Act, like the Radio Act, established that
the federal government "owned" the spectrum in
trust for the public and could only allow spectrum
use that served the "public interest, convenience
and necessity. '36 The Communications Act states
that spectrum licensees do not hold and must
regulation of radio. See Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 212.
32 See id. at 212 (noting that the interference resulted in
confusion and chaos so disturbing that President Hoover
urged Congress for legislation to remedy the situation that
had been allowed to grow in the regulatory conflict's para-
lyzing shadow).
33 Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162,
1171-72 (1927) (repealed by the Communications Act of
1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)); See Nat'l
Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 212-14 (recounting that the Commu-
nications Act adopted the four basic provisions of the Radio
Act and replaced the agency created by the Radio Act, the
Federal Radio Commission, with the Federal Communica-
tions Commission).
34 See Noam, supra note 25, at 766-68 (describing the
post-Radio Act of 1927 period as the "administrative para-
digm" that remains fundamentally intact despite the recent
introduction of market based policies, resulting in a single
"licensed exclusivity" paradigm).
35 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48
Stat. 1064, 1066 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-710 (1994)); see FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S.
134, 137 (1940) (confirming incorporation of the Radio Act
into the Communications Act).
36 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1994) (enabling the Commission
to grant license applications if public interest, convenience
and necessity are served); 47 U.S.C. § 308(a) (1994) (stating
that the Commission may issue a license only upon written
application); 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1994) (requiring the Com-
mission to make public interest, convenience and necessity
analysis for each application filed).
37 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (stating "no such license shall
be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, condi-
tions, and periods of the license"); 47 U.S.C. § 304 (1994)
(requiring a prospective licensee to waive "any claim to the
use of any particular frequency or of the electromagnetic
waive any ownership interest in the frequency that
they are assigned. 37 The Communications Act es-
tablished an application process by which the
Commission exercises its power and discretion
38
and requires licensees to acquire government ap-
proval before transferring control of a license.
3 9
In addition, the Communications Act empowered
the government to make licenses available at zero
price and almost automatically renewable.
40
The process of spectrum assignment that
emerged from this transition to government over-
sight essentially created four stages of spectrum
regulation. 4 1 First, the FCC allocates a specific
band of spectrum to a particular use. Second, the
FCC determines service rules, such as the power
of the signal. Third, the FCC assigns (or grants)
licenses to individuals for operating in an allo-
cated spectrum band and in keeping with the ser-
vice rules. Fourth and finally, the FCC enforces
each of the other three stages to ensure efficient
spectrum use.42
In enacting both the Radio Act and Communi-
cations Act, Congress reasoned that radio spec-
spectrum as against the regulatory power of the United States
because of the previous use of the same, whether by license
or otherwise").
38 47 U.S.C. § 301 (requiring spectrum users to hold a
license before operating on the spectrum); 47 U.S.C. § 309
(laying out the application process).
39 As discussed at length later in this comment, 47 U.S.C.
§ 310(d) (1994) requires licensees to obtain Commission ap-
proval before transferring control of their license or facilities.
See discussion infra Part III.A.
40 Since a license technically does not confer any prop-
erty rights under the Act, a licensee need not pay anything,
other than an application fee, for the license. Although 47
U.S.C. § 309(j) (1995 & Supp. IV 1998) authorizes the Com-
mission to implement auctions (competitive bidding) in as-
signing licenses, a winning auction bid is technically not a
payment for the license, but only an objective indicator the
Commission can use to determine who values the spectrum
the most. As will be explained later in the article, the Com-
mission has employed other assigning licenses not involving
economic inputs. 47 U.S.C. § 309 (authorizing the Commis-
sion to employ several methods (comparative hearings, lot-
teries and auctions) in granting licenses); see Lawrence J.
White, "Propertyizing" the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why it's Im-
portant, and How to Begin, 9 MEDIAL. & POL'Y 19, 24 (2000)
[hereinafter White] (noting that the Commission and its
predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission, have turned the
spectrum license into a quasi-property right by assigning
spectrum at zero price with almost automatic certainty); see
generally Lili Levi, Not With a Bang But a Whimper: Broadcast
License Renewal and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29
CONN. L. REV. 243 (1996) (giving a detailed analysis and criti-
cism of the Commission's creation of renewal expectancy).
41 White, supra note 40, at 23-24.
42 Id. at 24; 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1994) (laying out the pow-
ers and dities of the Commission).
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trum is a scarce resource belonging to the general
public and that, if left unsupervised, interference
caused by a few users would render the medium
virtually useless to everyone else.4 3 The Supreme
Court laid out this argument in National Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC44. Then, the Court memorialized it
as the "physical scarcity doctrine" in Red Lion
Broadcasting v. FCC,45 where it held that the gov-
ernment is not only justified, but obligated to pre-
vent the confusion and chaos of radio interfer-
ence by managing the spectrum.4
6
While the FCC and courts embraced the physi-
cal scarcity doctrine, many contemporary legal
and economic theorists have taken more critical
views of the government's decision to intercede in
spectrum assignment. 47 Former University of Cali-
fornia-Davis Professor of Economics Thomas Ha-
zlett asserts that the true impetus for regulation
was not interference-driven scarcity, as National
Broadcasting Co. and Red Lion Broadcasting as-
serted, but rather came from the search for politi-
cal and economic gains among well-positioned
powerbrokers. 48 In criticizing the current spec-
trum-licensing regime and advocating a return to
de facto spectrum property rights, Hazlett argues
that interference and the scarcity issue were made
up by politicians eager to gain content control
over the powerful new medium and cooperative
broadcasters seeking limited competition and
guaranteed free rents to create a system of gov-
ernment-imposed scarcity.49
4" See Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 212 ("Congress acted
upon the knowledge that if the potentialities of radio were
not to be wasted, regulation was essential.").
44 Id. at 227.
45 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
46 Id. at 389-90 (holding that, in light of spectrum's
physical scarcity, the First Amendment right to free speech of
some spectrum users must be restricted, via regulation, in or-
der to protect the majority of spectrum user's free speech
rights from being infringed upon by interference).
47 Legal scholars, who are unconvinced by the scarcity
doctrine, have argued alternatively that. the truly unique na-
ture of broadcast television and radio is what separates it
from other media (i.e., print) and makes its heightened reg-
ulation more appropriate. See ITHIEL DE SOI.A POOL, TECH-
NOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 235 (1983); LucAs A. POWEJR., AMERI-
CAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 197-212
(1987).
48 Thomas W. Hazlett, Physicat Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and
the First Amendment, 97 COLUM. L. RiEv. 905, 913 (1997) [here-
inafter Hazlett].
49 Id. at 919-21 (noting politicians' concern over the so-
cial and political import of the powerfully invasive medium,
their immediate censorship of radio content, and broadcast-
ers' eagerness to self-regulate, rather than challenge censor-
According to Hazlett, the period preceding the
Radio Act was actually marked by the "orderly de-
velopment" of a system of spectrum assignment
and operation relatively free from interference. 50
As noted above, the limited scope of the Radio
Act of 1912 had essentially given a de facto prop-
erty interest to the first user of a frequency and
even spawned privately orchestrated time-sharing
agreements and avenues of redress to resolve in-
terference disputes.
5'
Hazlett points to yearly growth of radio set sales
that lasted until 1926 to support his version of the
regulatory transition. 52 According to Hazlett, it
was not until 1926 that the alliance of politicians
and broadcasters discovered the interference and
scarcity issue, which resulted in a legal crisis that
eliminated the existing defacto property right sys-
tem and its underlying regulatory structure.
53
This left a regulatory vacuum in which chaos
thrived, true interference materialized, the scar-
city doctrine gained political currency and the
power elite assumed control of the medium in the
name of the public interest.54 However, regardless
of the physical scarcity doctrine's veracity, it unde-
niably fueled the transition to government admin-
istration of the spectrum that has survived to this
day.
3. The transition to lotteries and auctions
Because licenses were granted at a zero price
ship).
50 Id. at 913-15.
51 SeeTribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broad. Station (Cir. Ct.,
Cook County, Ill. 1926) (recognizing a broadcaster's prop-
erty right in the spectrum); Hazlett, supra note 48, at 913-15
(noting private agreements to share spectrum and resolve in-
terference disputes).
52 Hazlett, supra note 48, at 915-17 (noting radio set
sales dropped after steady growth when the Secretary of
Commerce and Labor abandoned attempts to enforce the de
facto property rights system that flourished tinder the mini-
mal license requirements of the Radio Act of 1912).
53 Hazlett recounts then-Secretary of Commerce and La-
bor Herbert Hoover's efforts to have the federal courts invali-
date the defacto property rights regime, so that a system giv-
ing government greater regulatory discretion could be
installed to the benefit of the politically powerful. Id. at
917-24.
54 Hazlett also relies on the memoirs of one of the con-
gressional architects of the Radio Act and Communications
Act, U.S. Senator Clarence C. Dill, to show that legislators
enacted legislation to stave off common law decisions grant-
ing licensees legally enforceable property rights over their li-
censed spectrum. Id. at 919, 924-26.
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and license renewals were almost always guaran-
teed, the value of spectrum licenses and the stakes
surrounding the process of their assignment
skyrocketed shortly after the new process of gov-
ernment regulation began. 55 Until later amend-
ments were made to the Communications Act, the
FCC initially assigned mutually exclusive licenses
(where two or more applicants exist) through
comparative hearings; in comparative hearings,
the applicant deemed to be the best suited to
serve the public interest was selected.56 Of course,
as the value of licenses soared and their duration
remained indefinite, comparative hearings
proved unable to serve the public interest effec-
tively.57 The FCC was stuck with the existing politi-
cal dynamic identified by Hazlett 58 and swamped
with applications from parties looking to exploit
new technologies and the increased spectral
bandwidth they delivered. 59 The result was a se-
ries of inefficient assignments and uses of spec-
trum contrary to the public interest.60
Congress initially responded to this crisis by au-
thorizing the FCC to implement lotteries for as-
signing licenses. 6' While lotteries assigned li-
55 See White, supra note 40, at 26 ("With licenses distrib-
uted for free, incumbent license holders often have an ex-
tremely valuable privilege that they are understandably reluc-
tant to see undermined."); Noam, supra note 25, at 767
(noting that spectrum's value grew as it was used more
widely).
56 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (requiring the Commission to
make a public interest determination before granting a li-
cense to an applicant); Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326
U.S. 327, 333 (1945) (initiating comparative hearings by
holding that granting a license after only hearing from one
of two or more mutually exclusive applicants deprives the
loser of a meaningful hearing opportunity guaranteed by
§ 309(a), even if the loser has a hearing set for a later date);
Noam, supra note 25, at 766 (stating that comparative hear-
ings resulted in assignment to private firms based on connec-
tions and effective lobbying).
57 See White, supra note 40, at 26.
58 See Noam, supra note 25, at 767 (explaining that as the
spectrum value rose in proportion to administratively-im-
posed scarcity, broadcasters lobbied regulators and politi-
cians for stronger monopoly rents, while regulators and poli-
ticians exacted greater content control and political capital
from broadcasters); White, supra note 40, at 26 (noting that
extensive corporate lobbying often results in noncompeti-
tion-based selection of marketplace winners and losers as
capital is not put to its most productive use).
59 See Noam, supra note 25, at 767 (explaining that the
emergence of cablecasters and mobile providers and their in-
satiable appetite for spectrum set the stage for change);
Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum
Users: Why Did the FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. &
ECON. 529, 556 (1998) (" [N] onbroadcast services emerged to
challenge [the] 'broadcast hegemony' in the 1980s.").
censes efficiently, they were also "arbitrary" and
resulted in windfalls for speculators whose only in-
terest in the license was to sell it to another party
at a considerable profit.62 After lotteries proved to
be a losing concept, Congress authorized the FCC
to auction off spectrum licenses and ushered in
the next major transition in spectrum policy.
6 3
While Congress did not authorize spectrum li-
cense auctions until passage of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (the "Budget
Act"), 64 the concept of spectrum auctions has
been around since the early 1950's, when law stu-
dent Leo Herzel first advocated the sale of spec-
trum to the highest bidder in a 1951 law review
article. 65 The idea of spectrum auctions was then
adopted and cultivated by law and economics the-
orists like Ronald H. Coase.66 These theorists
stressed that auctions ensured that the spectrum
was put to its most highly valued and efficient use.
Their theory was criticized sharply at first, espe-
cially at the FCC.67 However, as the power and
logic of the auction concept continued to burn
brightly, auction advocates gained disciples and
their message eventually became gospel to most
60 See White, supra note 40, at 25-26 (citing protection of
local network broadcasters from competition by the unbal-
anced structuring of local markets and delay of cellular roll-
out as instances of inefficient assignments).
61 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (1994 & Supp IV 1998) (authorizing
the FCC to implement "random selection" (i.e., lotteries) to
assign licenses).
62 Noam, supra note 25, at 767; White, supra note 40, at
24.
63 47 U.S.C. § 3090) (authorizing FCC to implement
"competitive bidding" (i.e., auctions) to assign licenses).
64 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-66, 6002(c), 107 Stat. 312, 396 (1993) (authorizing
auctions by adding § 309(j) to the Communications Act).
65 Leo Herzel, "Public Interest" and the Market in Color Tele-
vision Regulation, 18 U. C-. L. REV. 802, 811 (1951).
66 R. H. Coase, The Federal Communication Commission, 2
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959) [hereinafter Coase].
67 At the time spectrum auctions began to be suggested
by Herzel and Coase, FCC Chief Economist Dallas Smythe's
statements placing spectrum auctions beyond the pale of rea-
sonable contemplation was representative of the general
opinions of those in academia, policymakers and broadcast-
ers of the day. Noam, supra note 25, at 768; R. H. Coase, Com-
ment on Thomas W Hazlett: Assigning Property Rights to Radio
Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41
J.L. & ECON. 577, 579 (1998) (recalling FCC 1Commissioner
Philip S. Cross' question during Coase's testimony before the
Commission of whether Coase's testimony was "'all a big
joke'") (quoting an internal Rand Institute analysis of his
auction proposal as stating, "I know of no country on the face
of the globe-except for a few corrupt Latin American dicta-




economists and policymakers.68 By 1993, the ad-
ministrative and political headaches of compara-
tive hearings and the arbitrage of lotteries com-
bined with rising budget deficits made the
efficiency and revenue-raising potential of auc-
tions attractive enough for Congress to pass the
Budget Act and its amendment to the Communi-
cations Act (section 309(j) which authorizes spec-
trum license auctions).
69
4. The reemergence of property rights in spectrum
policy
Today, spectrum auctions are clearly the pre-
ferred method of assigning licenses.7Y) As noted,
they are more efficient than comparative hear-
ings, more effective at putting the spectrum to its
highest valued use than lotteries, and represent a
tremendous revenue stream for the govern-
ment. 71 More importantly, the use of auctions has
68 Noam, supra note 25, at 768.
69 While it is clear that budgetary considerations made
auctions more acceptable on Capitol Hill, Congress directly
prohibited the Commission from considering potential fed-
eral revenues from auctions when granting licenses or
promulgating rules. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(7); see also White,
supra note 40, at 25 (noting the congressional desire to offset
budget deficits with spectrum auction proceeds).
70 See Noam, supra note 25, at 768 ("Today, the advocates
of this auction paradigm are in the driver's seat.").
71 As of Feb. 23, 2001, the Commission's auctions have
generated almost $42 billion in revenues. These results are
calculated from the data that can be found on the FCC web-
site at www.fcc.gov/wtb/auctions.
72 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57
AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967) (characterizing property as a bun-
dle of rights and property's value as the market value of those
rights).
73 SeeJOSEpH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLI-
CES, AND PRACTICES 4-5 (2d ed. 1997) (listing the most im-
portant property rights as being: 1) the liberty to use; 2) the
right to exclude; 3) the power to transfer; 4) the power to
devise or bequeath; 5) immunity from damage; and 6) imnmu-
nity from expropriation). See generally J.E. Penner, The "Bun-
dle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996)
(detailing a comprehensive critical analysis of property as a
bundle of rights).
74 Former FCC Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth
vigorously asserts that while firms accept a basic level of "mar-
ket uncertainty" as to the property, contract and liability
rules of a market regulatory action by government (who is
often a market participant) raises uncertainty about what the
future will hold and disrupts the natural competitive balance
of the market. See In re Principles for Promoting the Efficient
Use of Spectrum by Encouraging the Development of Secon-
dary Markets, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd.
24,203, 24,259 (Separate Statement of Harold Furchtgott-
Roth) (2000) [hereinafter Furchtgott-Roth's Statement to Secon-
dary Markets NPRM].
reintroduced the concept of property rights into
spectrum regulatory policy.
Under a traditional realist approach, property
is a "bundle of rights." 72 The right to exclude, the
right to use, and the right to alienate or transfer
property are among the most important rights in
the bundle.7 3 When these rights are restricted by
ambiguous or overly burdensome regulations,
property owners become uncertain of their
rights.7 4  This "regulatory uncertainty" makes
owners less likely to invest in their property.
75
However, when such regulations are eliminated,
or at least clarified, owners may use their property
more confidently. 76 In the context of spectrum,
the Commission has vested rights in licenses very
similar to those of the more conventional forms
of property.77 As a result, when licensees have
clearer ideas of their rights (like other property
holders), they are more willing to invest in inno-
vative technologies that more efficiently use spec-
75 Regulatory uncertainty causes asset values to decline,
while market participants are simultaneously discouraged
from engaging in transactions. See id. Unsurprisingly, by dis-
couraging investment, regulatory uncertainty directly im-
pedes technological advances. Edie Herman, Regulatory Im-
pediments Blamed for Technology Lag, WARREN'S WASH. INTERNET
DAILY, Feb. 26, 2001, at 3,4 (quoting current IBM Director of
Internet Technology and former White House and FCC offi-
cial Mike Nelson as saying, "the Internet revolution is less
than 3% complete" partly because regulatory uncertainty dis-
courages investment and deters the deployment of new prod-
tCts).
76 It is not until buyers and sellers in a market have com-
plete information on the existing and future rights associated
with their property that the "market uncertainty" necessary
for efficient, volatile markets exists. See Furchtgott-Roth's State-
ment to Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,259.
77 Noted telecommunications policy experts Howard
Shelanski and Peter Huber assert that while the language of
the Communications Act denies licensees an "ownership
right" in the spectrum, the statute has allowed the Commis-
sion to vest licensees with so many of the same rights as con-
ventional forms of property that a license may now be consid-
ered an administratively created quasi-property right. These
experts recognize licensees' right to exclude others in the
Commission's interference and unauthorized reception pro-
tections, the right to use in the Communications Act's grant
of unrestricted transmission rights within boundaries and the
right to alienate in § 310(b)'s requirement that the Commis-
sion treat license transfer hearings like initial licensing or re-
newal hearings. See Howard A. Shelanski & Peter W. Huber,
Administrative Creation of Property Rights to Radio Spectrum, 41
J.L. & ECON. 581 (1998); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 33 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter Pos-
NER] (asserting there are property rights in spectrum fre-
quencies because "[o]nce obtained[,] the right is
transferable . . . [a] nd it is for all practical purposes perpet-
ual.").
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trum. 78 Competition then increases as new mar-
ket entrants attempt to take advantage of new
technologies and the newly liberated spectrum
that the technology helped create. 79 Ultimately,
the public interest is more effectively served when
spectrum users' property rights are clarified by
the Commission.80
While the Commission has created administra-
tively quasi-property rights for licensees through
its auctions and rules, policymakers are now seek-
ing to introduce even clearer and stronger prop-
erty rights and market forces into other areas
under the Commission's jurisdiction."' The sec-
ondary markets rulemaking currently before the
Commission is a direct result of that effort.82 This
rulemaking is essentially an effort to clarify the
right of licensees to alienate or transfer their in-
terests (licenses) in order that individual licensees
(and the market as whole) may reap the eco-
nomic and technological benefits described
above. However, to achieve this clarity, the FCC
must reconcile the push toward greater property
rights with the current system of administrative
oversight in the Communications Act and FCC
regulations.
III. CHALLENGES POSED BY THE ACT AND
BY FCC STANDARDS
A. The FCC's requirements to approve license
alienation: Section 310(d) of the
Communications Act
As noted above, the secondary markets
78 Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 7, at 14 ("Competition
flourishes best when those property rights are clearly defined
and enforced. Similarly, licensees will have greater incentive
to invest and think creatively about evolutionary spectrum
uses if government does not constrain these choices."); see
also White, supra note 40, at 32.
79 See Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 7, at 14.
80 Id.
81 DeVany, supra note 19, at 629 ("The auctions surely
are a better way to issue licenses than the arbitrary ways of the
past, but they have not given us the flexibility and incentives
that are the prime advantages of a market over an adminis-
tered system.").
82 See Furchtgott-Roth 's Statement to Secondary Markets
NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,257-58 (asserting that a secondary
market proposal seeks to clarify licensees' rights, but does
not go "far enough" in that direction).
83 Secondary Markets Policy Statement, 15 FCC Rcd. at
24,186, para. 20.
84 Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,204-05,
para. 3.
85 47 U.S.C. § 310(d). The Commission's Rules also pro-
rulemaking is intended to give greater property
rights to spectrum licensees, particularly the right
to assign, lease, or transfer control of a license or
construction permit.8 3 , The Commission seeks to
use the secondary markets rulemaking proceed-
ing to amend its rules regarding license owner-
ship restrictions and its tests for de facto transfers
of control to achieve this end. 4 The Commis-
sion's statutory mandate to review and pass judg-
ment on the transfers stems from Section 310(d)
of the Communications Act:
No construction permit or station license, or any rights
thereunder, shall be transferred, assigned, or disposed
of in any manner, voluntarily or involuntarily, directly
or indirectly, or by transfer of control of any corpora-
tion holding such permit or license, to any person ex-
cept upon application to the Commission and upon
finding by the Commission that the public interest,
convenience, and necessity will be served thereby.
8 5
Thus, under Section 310(d), all licensees must
seek and obtain Commission approval before as-
signinge-" or transferring control of a license or
construction permit.8 7 This requirement applies
to both de facto and de jure transfers of control.88
In addition, the Commission's rules prohibit
licensees from avoiding their obligations under
the Communications Act, the Commission's rules
and the terms of their station authorizations.8 9 A
failure to comply with this requirement may result
hibit the assignment or transfer of a construction permit, li-
cense or rights stemming from either, without prior Commis-
sion approval. Application for Voluntary Assignment or
Transfer of Control, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3540 (2000).
86 See Questions & Answers Regarding Private Wireless
Licensees' Obligations Under Section 310(d) of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934, Fact Sheet, 2000 FCC Lexis 4926, at 4
(2000). "An assignment of authorization is a transaction in
which the license is assigned by one entity to another. For
example, a transaction in which a private land mobile radio
license switches from Company A to Company B would con-
stitute an assignment of license." Id.
87 Id. ("A transfer of control is a transaction in which the
licensee remains the same, but control of the licensee-entity
is transferred from one person or entity or group of persons
or entities to another.").
88 Loraine Journal Co. v. FCC, 351 F.2d 824, 828-29
(D.C. Cir. 1965); In re Application of Town & Country Radio,
Inc., Rockford, Ill. for Constr. Permit, 28 F.C.C. 129,151
(1960) (citing decisions).
89 General Operating Requirements, 47 C.F.R.
§ 90.403(a)-(b) (2000) (requiring compliance to the Coin-
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in forfeitures being assessed by the Commission.9D
In cases where transfer of control has been mis-
represented or concealed from the Commission,
revocation of the licensee's authorization may be
the result.1'1 On the other hand, Section 310(d)
obligates the Commission to review assignment
and transfer of control applications on a case-by-
case basis.9
2
For the purposes of fostering secondary mar-
kets in spectrum through the proliferation of leas-
ing agreements, it is of primary importance for
parties seeking to enter such agreements to un-
derstand the term "control," as used in Section
310(d). Parties seeking to enter into leasing
agreements must answer the question of how
much "control" over the license the original licen-
see can give to the prospective lessee before the
transaction becomes a "transfer of control" under
Section 310(d) and requires Commission ap-
proval. For guidance, applicants can turn to a se-
ries of FCC adjudications in which the agency has
set various standards for what constitutes "con-
trol" of a license.'- However, the determination of
"control" can still be a difficult for applicants to
munications Act for Private Mobile Radio Services (PMRS)).
90 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1) (1994) (establishing that forfeit-
ures may be assessed against any person who "willfully or re-
peatedly" fails to comply substantially with terms of any li-
cense, the provisions of the Communications Act or with any
rule, regulation, or order issued by the Commission).
91 See In re Silver Star Communications-Albany, Inc., Mem-
orandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 6905, para. 20 (1991)
(citing In re Silver Star Communications-Albany, Inc., 3 FCC
Rcd. 6342, 6355 (1988)) (citing Revocation of the License of
Blue Ribbon Broadcasting, Inc. (Salem, Va.)), Decision, 90
F.C.C.2d 1023 (1982); In re Application of Stereo Broadcast-
ers, Inc., for License Renewal (Garden City, NY), Decision, 87
F.C.C.2d 87 (1981).
92 William C. Beckwith, Cutting the Cord: Removing the
CMRS Spectrum Cap to Promote Wireless Landline Convergence and
Wireless Alternatives in the Local Loop, 7 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS
369, 374 (1999) [hereinafter Beckwith] (citing Comments of
the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association, to
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in VT Dkt No. 98-205, at 23
(Jan. 25, 1999)).
93 As will be discussed later in this article, there are sev-
eral standards of control that vary according to the use the
spectrum is being put. See infra Part III.B.
94 At a Public Forum on secondary markets held at the
Commission on May 31, 2000, former Wireless Telecommu-
nications Bureau Chief Michele Farquhar commented on the
general confusion among licensees about what constitutes
control and that that confusion stems from the Commission's
failure to convey adequately the message to all licensees. See
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, FEDERAL COMMUNI-
CATIONS COMMISSION PUBLIC FORUM ON SECONDARY MARKETS
IN RADIo SPECTRUM 116, available at http://www.fcc.gov/
realaudio/presentations/2000/053100/welcome.html (last
make.9 4 It can be very time-consuming, expensive
and even cost-prohibitive for parties unwilling to
risk an incorrect determination or live with an ar-
rangement dictated by what they understand to
be the Commission's restrictions on control.
9 5
B. The Intermountain Microwave standard and its
chilling effect on spectrum leasing
The Commission has exercised a wide range of
discretion in determining and enforcing its stan-
dards for what constitutes "control" under Section
310(d). 16 In enacting the Communications Act,
Congress declined to define "control" to not inad-
vertently limit its meaning.9 7 This congressional
action has enabled the Commission to interpret
and apply the term relatively freely.98 The FCC's
discretion in defining "control" is reflected in the
variable standards it has for different types of li-
censes and its ability to interpret those standards
liberally. 9- The Commission established its test for
who controls a common carrier license when it is-
sued its 1963 Intermountain Microwave decision. °00
In Intermountain Microwave, the Commission deter-
visited Sept. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Public Forum].
95 This situation epitomizes the concept of "regulatory
uncertainty." Furchtgott-Roth's Statement to Secondary Markets
NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,258-59.
96 See LorainJournal Co., 351 F.2d at 828-29 (stating that
§ 310(d) "speaks in broad terms in its prohibition of trans-
fers" without prior FCC public interest finding and the "stat-
ute is to be implemented in accordance with the agency's in-
terpretation that passage of control need 'not be legal
control in a formal sense, but may consist of actual control by
virtue of the special circumstances presented.'") (quoting
Town and Country Radio Inc., 15 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1035, 1057
(1960)).
97 H.R. REP. No. 73-1850, at 4-5 (1934) (explaining that
"control" was not defined because would it would be "diffi-
cult to do... without limiting the meaning of the term in an
unfortunate manner").
98 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (holding that in the absence of
a congressional definition, the courts will defer to agency def-
initions so long as they are not arbitrary, capricious or mani-
festly contrary to the statute); see also Secondary Markets NPRM,
15 FCC Rcd. at 24,228, para. 71 (citing In re Application of
Stereo Broadcasters, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 55
F.C.C.2d 819, 821, para. 7 (1975) [hereinafter Stereo Broad-
casters] ("[T]he [C]ommission is not bound by any exact
formula in its determination of whether control of a . . . li-
censee has been transferred in violation of Section
310(d).")).
99 Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,228, para.
71 ("[T]he Commission has developed different criteria for
different sets of licenses when determining whether control
has been transferred.").
100 Applications for Microwave Transfers to Tele-
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mined that the ultimate test for control under sec-
tion 310(d) is whether the licensee retains "exclu-
sive responsibility for the operation and control of
the facilities."'' 1 In order to make this determina-
tion, the Commission laid out the following six
criteria that indicate control over a license: (1)
unfettered control of the facilities and equip-
ment; (2) control of day-to-day operations; (3) de-
termination and carrying out of policy decisions;
(4) oversight of employment, supervision, and dis-
missal of personnel; (5) responsibility for paying
financial obligations; and (6) receipt of profits
from the operation of the facilities. 10 2 In settling
on this standard, the FCC found that they re-
flected the basic and most common incidents of
control over a common carrier facility,' 03 and, as
such, the FCC has maintained them as "useful
guidelines."'
10 4
For parties attempting to solidify a spectrum
lease agreement, however, the Intermountain Mi-
crowave guidelines have proven to be less than
helpful. 0 5 As technologies evolve and spawn new
contractual arrangements to facilitate their use,
Intermountain Microwave's control criteria seem
more confusing for licensees and prospective les-
sees, as they must continually apply an old stan-
dard to new circumstances. 10 6 Indeed, until re-
prompter Approved with Warning, Public Notice, 12 F.C.C.2d
559, 559-60 (1963) [hereinafter Intermountain Microwave].
101 Id.
102 Id. at 560.
103 Id.
104 In re Application of Ellis Thompson Corp. for facili-
ties in the Domestic Public Cellular Radio Telecommunica-
tions Service on Frequency Block A in Market No. 134, Atlan-
tic City, New Jersey, Memorandum Opinion and Order and
Hearing Designation Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 7138, 7139, para. 9
(1994) [hereinafter Ellis Thompson].
105 Licensees such as Columbia, PCC, Pacific Bell and
NABOB have all indicated that the Intermountain Microwave
standard is no longer a workable tool in determining
whether a licensee has given over control of its licensed facili-
ties to another party. In re Implementation of Sections 3(n)
and 332 of the Communications Act Regulatory Treatment
of Mobile Services, Fourth Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 7123,
7127, para. 20 (1994) [hereinafter Mobile Services Fourth Report
& Order].
106 Former Commission Wireless Telecommunications
Bureau Chief Michele Farquhar cited uncertainty over the In-
termountain Microwave standard as an obstacle to secondary
market agreements for reluctant parties. See Public Forum,
supra note 94, at 106.
107 The legitimacy of this regulatory uncertainty within
control standards may actually have been planted by judicial
decisions holding that de facto control is by necessity such a
complex concept arising out of many circumstances that it
cannot always be divined from verification of nominal owner-
cently, the FCC has not only recognized this
regulatory uncertainty, but embraced it in its
rulemakings and other proceedings. 10 7 In a pro-
ceeding where the FCC was forced to conduct a
second Intermountain Microwave determination, af-
ter the D.C. Circuit found the initial determina-
tion to be "arbitrary and capricious,"' 08 the Com-
mission still stressed that "there is no exact
formula for determining control" and that deter-
minations must be based on the "totality of the
circumstances" in each case.' 0 9
In addition to regulatory uncertainty, the re-
quirements that the Intermountain Microwave
guidelines impose on contracting parties often
prove too unprofitable, and deals are abandoned
or never even begun. 110 While the first criterion
of "unfettered control of the facilities and equip-
ment" generally does not impose any difficulty for
licensees leasing their spectrum and facilities, the
second criterion, "day-to-day control of opera-
tions,"1'1 is more problematic because lessees gen-
erally want the autonomy that control over the
daily operations brings. 112 The third criterion of
who carries out policy decisions, including filing
applications with the FCC, is taken care of in the
contract between the parties and generally does
not present a problem." 3 However, the final
ship. See generally Rochester Tele. Corp. v. United States, 23 F.
Supp. 634, 636 (W.D.N.Y. 1938).
108 Tele. and Data Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 655, 658 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (vacating and remanding Commission application
of Intermountain Microwave criteria that was found to be so
"uneven" as to be "arbitrar[y] and capricio[us].").
109 Ellis Thompson, 9 FCC Rcd. at 7139, para. 10; see also
Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,228, para. 71 (cit-
ing Stereo Broadcasters, 55 F.C.C.2d at 821, para. 7) ("The as-
certainment of control in most instances must of necessity
transcend formulas, for it involves an issue of fact which must
be resolved by the special circumstances presented.").
110 See In re Principles for Promoting the Efficient Use of
Spectrum by Encouraging the Development of Secondary
Markets, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd. 24,203,
24,262 (Separate Statement of Gloria Tristani) (2000) [here-
inafter Tristani's Statement to Secondary Markets NPRM] ("We
are aware that some leasing arrangements are scuttled by reg-
ulatory uncertainty and others by the transactions cost of
transfer proceedings.").
1'' The Commission has generally interpreted that the
controlling factor in determining that control of the facilities
and equipment is "unfettered" is that "access is unimpaired."
In Re Applications of Brian L. O'Neill for Transfer of Con-
trol (Panama City, Fla.), Memorandum Opinion and Order and
Notice of Apparent Liability, 6 FCC Rcd. 2572, 2575, para. 28
(1991).




three criteria each contain the same autonomy
problems for lessees as the second criterion.'14
In addition to the Intermountain Microwave
guidelines, the FCC has established criteria to de-
termine control of other types of wireless licenses,
such as broadcast' 15 and specialized (private) mo-
bile radio (SMR) service licenses.' 16 The FCC es-
tablished its standards for control of SMR licenses
in its 1985 Motorola decision.'' 7 In Motorola, the
FCC's Private Radio Bureau' I' ruled that private
radio licensees could hire entities to manage their
systems, but licensees could not relinquish control
of their systems under a management or equip-
ment contract. To remain in control, the licensee
"must retain bona fide proprietary interests in,
and exercise supervisory control over, their sys-
tems." ' 19 The FCC, as in Intermountain Microwave,
laid out criteria to confirm a licensee's retention
of control in order to determine what constitutes
a bona fide proprietary interest. The first criterion
set out by the FCC requires that financing for the
purchase of the equipment be obtained from an
entity independent of the equipment vendor sys-
tem manager. 12 1 The second criterion is that the
equipment vendor manager does not sell equip-
ment to the licensee at a discount for the right to
manage the licensee's system.' 2 ' The third and fi-
114 Farquhar explained that the oversight of employ-
ment, supervision and dismissal of personnel responsibility
for paying financial obligations and receipt of profits from
the operation of the facilities all present problems to con-
tracting parties. Id. at 107.
115 Although excluded from the secondary markets
rulemaking, it is important to note the broadcast standards
for license control. Generally, the Commission considers
control overstation finances, personnel matters, and pro-
gramming in determining whether there has been a prema-
ture or unauthorized transfer of control in contravention of
§ 310(d). See In Re Applications of Southwest Texas Public
Broadcasting Council For Renewal of Licenses for Noncom-
mercial Educational Television Stations (San Antonio and
Austin, Tex.), Decision, 85 F.C.C.2d 713, 715 (1981).
1 16 A Specialized Mobile Radio Service (SMRS) "consists
of one or more base station transmitters, one or more anten-
nas, and end user radio equipment that usually consists of a
mobile radio unit either provided by the end user or ob-
tained from the SMR operator for a fee." WIRELESS TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMIS-
SION, SPECIALIZED MOIILE RADIO SERVICE, at http://
www.fcc.gov/wtb/smrs/ (last modified Apr. 26, 1999).
117 In re Applications of Motorola, Inc. for 800 MHz Spe-
cialized Mobile Radio Trunked Systems, Order, File Nos.
507505 et al., para. 14 (rel.Jul. 30, 1985) (announced by FCC
News Release No. 6440 (Aug. 15, 1985)) (test of control for
SMR services); see also Private Radio Bureau Reminds Licen-
sees of Guidelines Concerning Operation of SMR Stations
Under Management Contracts, Public Notice, 64 Rad. Reg. 2d
nal criterion is that the licensee's equipment
purchase is indistinguishable "from that of any
other SMR licensee that may purchase equipment
from a vendor but not employ that vendor to
manage the system."1 22 Motorola also requires that
a contract ensuring a licensee's authority to super-
vise, instruct and terminate a third party manager,
supports a finding that a licensee retains con-
trol. 123 As in the decisions applying Intermountain
Microwave control critieria, the FCC in Motorola
noted that the determination of control ulti-
mately turned on the circumstances of each indi-
vidual case.
1 24
While the general ad hoc approach of the Inter-
mountain Microwave and Motorola control guide-
lines may seem conscientious because of its fact-
sensitive nature, this approach by the FCC does
not provide clear and unmistakable standards that
licensees can determine and rely on consistently
when making decisions. 125 As noted above, such
"regulatory uncertainty" has a distinct "chilling ef-
fect" on investment in wireless licenses and secon-
dary market transactions, such as spectrum
leases. 126 Parties simply do not feel comfortable
entering into arrangements when their rights and
obligations are not clear and potential liability is
uncertain. 12 7 Also, parties must work out intricate
(P & F) 840 (1988) [hereinafter Motorola] (restating control
standards).
I'll The Public Safety and Private Wireless Division of the
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau have since subsumed
the Private Radio Bureau and its duties. WIRELESS TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMIS-
SION, available at http://www.fcc.gov/wtb/organization/
#private (last modified Jan. 10, 2001).






125 The broadcast standard is also applied by the FCC on
a case-by-case basis, leaving broadcast licensees equally con-
fused as wireless licensees. See, e.g., Michael E. Lewyn, When is
Time Brokerage A Transfer of Control? The FCC's Regulation of Lo-
cal Marketing Agreements and the Need for Rulemaking, 6 FORD-
HAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1 (1995) (exploring
practitioners difficulty in navigating the FCC's control stan-
dards for broadcasting licenses).
126 See supra notes 74-75.
127 At the Public Forum, the panelists noted attorneys'
reluctance to issue legal opinions that leasing agreements
comply with Commission rules or the Communications Act
serves as a disincentive to entering into secondary market
transactions. See Secondary Markets Policy Statement, 15 FCC
Rcd. at 24,184, para. 15.
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contracts to ensure that they do not run afoul of
Intermountain Microwave guidelines and section
310(d) and increase transaction costs while di-
minishing potential profits. 128 As a result, these
disincentives keep spectrum allocations, which no
longer represent the most efficient use of the
spectrum, from being corrected via secondary
market transactions. 129 Also, these disincentives
are widely recognized as the primary obstacle to
spectrum leasing and, in turn, secondary mar-
kets.' 30 Moreover, it is these disincentives that the
FCC's secondary markets in spectrum rulemaking
is aimed at correcting.'
3 '
IV. PROMOTING THE EFFICIENT USE OF
SPECTRUM BY ENCOURAGING THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SECONDARY
MARKETS: THE FCC'S NOTICE OF
PROPOSED RULEMAKING
A. Goal of the Rulemaking and Guiding
Principles
The Commission initiated the secondary mar-
kets initiative with the primary goal of streamlin-
ing or eliminating rules and regulations that cur-
rently hinder the free flow of market forces in the
wireless industry.1 32 In taking this step, the Com-
mission recognized the growing demand for spec-
128 Robert Shriver, President & CEO, Securicor Wireless
Holdings, Inc. commented at the Public Forum that in order
to comply with Intermountain Microwave, the leasing agree-
ments his corporation enters into are often "time and re-
source intensive, cumbersome, costly and difficult to admin-
ister." Public Forum, supra note 94, at 112.
129 See Robinson, supra note 10, at 619-20 (stating that
secondary markets are necessary to ensure the continued effi-
ciency of spectrum allocations, post-auction, in light of
changing economic and technological circumstances).
130 The Commission recognizes multiple licensee con-
cerns unrelated to the Intermountain Microwave control stan-
dards that may explain why many licensees are unwilling to
currently trade their rights to unused spectrum. They in-
clude: (1) the concern that more spectrum will be needed in
the future; (2) speculation on future increases in the value of
spectrum; or (3) a belief that partition or disaggregation
would diminish the license's value. However, the Commis-
sion proposes spectrum leasing as a mechanism to address
these concerns. Secondary Markets Policy Statement, 15 FCC
Rcd. at 24,184-85, paras. 15-16.
131 Id. at 24,185, para. 17.
132 Secondary Markets Policy Statement, 15 FCC Rcd. at
24,186, para. 19 (describing the relaxing of rules and policies
as a "major focus of [the FCC's] secondary markets efforts.").
The Secondary Markets NPRM's other goals include: (1) "en-
courage advances in equipment [such as software-defined ra-
dio (SDR)] that will facilitate use of available spectrum for a
trum being fueled by the deployment of evolving
wireless technologies and secondary markets' po-
tential to free up that desired spectrum from in-
tentional and unintentional regulatory re-
straints. 13 13 In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (the
"Secondary Markets NPRM"), this effort to revise
Commission rules focuses on the ability of licen-
sees to lease their spectrum to third parties with-
out prior Commission approval and minimal
Commission interference. 3 4 The Secondary Mar-
kets NPRM concludes that expanded spectrum
leasing would serve the public interest, conve-
nience and necessity by facilitating the rapid and
efficient allocation of spectrum that would, in
turn, make more of the scarce resource available
for emerging spectrum hungry services. 
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In the Policy Statement (the "Secondary Markets
Policy Statement') accompanying the Secondary Mar-
kets NPRM, the Commission laid out the following
general principles to guide the initiative with re-
spect to licensees' and spectrum users' rights:
" Licensees should generally have clearly defined us-
age rights to their spectrum, including frequency
bands, service areas, and license terms of sufficient
length, with reasonable renewal expectancy, to en-
courage investment.
" Licenses and spectrum usage rights should be easily
transferable for lease or sale, divisible, or aggregat-
able.
* Licensee/users should have flexibility in determin-
ing the services to be provided and the technology
broad range of services", and (2) "encourage the develop-
ment of mechanisms, such as informational sources, that
help enable markets to work better." See Secondary Markets
NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,205, para. 4 (citing Secondary Mar-
kets Policy Statement, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,185, para. 17).
133 Secondary Markets Policy Statement, 15 FCC Rcd. at
24,180, paras. 7-8; see also William Kennard, Public Forum,
supra note 94, at 5 ("[The wireless Internet] revolution is just
beginning to hit the United States. And it is going to hit us
fast. And we've got to be prepared for it.").
134 Notice for Proposed Rulemakings are procedural
mechanisms of administrative law that inform the public of
proposals to change agency rules and request written com-
ments within a designated timeframe from interested parties.
The agency, the FCC in this case, adopts, amends or affirms
its rules and regulations based on the comments its receives
and its own research. Rule makings are authorized under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994). It
should be noted that the window for initial comments to the
NPRM closed on Feb. 9, 2001, and the window for reply com-
ments closed Mar. 9, 2001. See Promoting Efficient Use of
Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Develop-
ment of Secondary Markets, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,475 (Dec. 26,
2000) (proposed Nov. 9, 2000) (noting comment and reply
comments dates).




used for operation consistent with the other policies
and rules governing the service.
Licensees/users have a fundamental obligation to
protect against and the right to be protected from
interference to the extent provided in the Commis-
sion's rules. " 6
To a certain extent, these principles reflect the
challenge that the spectrum leasing proposal
poses to the Commission. On the one hand, the
Commission must tailor its rules to provide parties
with more clearly defined rights to ensure that
there are incentives for entry into spectrum
leases. However, at the same time, the Commis-
sion must act within the boundaries of Section
310(d)'s control requirement by engaging in a
confusing legal fiction-licensees retain control
in name, but not in deed. The Secondary Markets
Policy Statement aptly illustrate this conflict by not-
ing that while some advocates have rightly pushed
for a more "property-right [s]" spectrum policy, 
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the Communications Act explicitly recognizes
that the use of spectrum is limited and "ultimately
belongs to the public and not to individual licen-
sees.""' In addition, the Secondary Markets Policy
Statement reiterates the Commission's statutory au-
thority and ultimate administrative control over
the spectrum. '- 9 It is the need for licensee control
that the Commission must meet while developing
incentives that may directly challenge that con-
trol.1411 Ultimately, the Commission's spectrum
136_ Secondary Markets Policy Statement, 15 FCC Rcd.at
24,186, para. 20.
137 Id. at 24,187, para. 21 n.29 (citing the Secondary Mar-
kets Public Forum testimony of former FCC Commissioner
Furchtgott-Roth, Tom Hazlett, Resident Scholar, American
Enterprise Institute and Peter Cramton, Spectrum Exchange
and Professor of Economics, University of Maryland).
138 Id. at 24,187, para. 21.
19 Id. at 24,188, para. 24.
140 Id. (stating that this process is a balancing of [the
Commission's] duty to exercise its authority to protect the
public interest against the ability of licensees to freely trade
their spectrum usage rights).
141 The Wireless Radio Services addressed by the Secon-
dary Markets NPRM's leasing proposal include the following:
Personal Communications Service (PCS), Cellular Radiotele-
phone Service (Cellular), Public Mobile Services other than
cellular; Specialized Mobile Radio Service (SMRS); Wireless
Communications Service (WCS), Local Multipoint Distribu-
tion Service (LMDS), Fixed Microwave Service, 700 MHz Ser-
vice; 700 MHz Guard Band Service; 39 GHz Service, 24 GHz
Service, 3650-3700 MHz Service, 218-219 MHz Service, and
Private Land Mobile Radio Services (PLMRS). These licenses
are set forth in § 1.907 of the Commission's rules. Secondary
Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,213, para. 24 n.40.
142 Id. at 24,213, para. 24 n.41 (defining "exclusive" au-
thority as meaning the Commission's rules provide for "mu-
tual exclusivity in the event of competing applications in the
leasing proposal represents its attempt to handle
this conflict while developing the most rational
rules possible.
B. Spectrum Leasing Proposal
The Secondary Markets NPRM only applied the
leasing proposal to certain Wireless Radio Ser-
vices licenses' 4' with "'exclusive'" authority 4 2 to
use assigned spectrum in their service areas.'
143
The Secondary Markets NPRM did not apply the
leasing proposal to satellite licenses or to licenses
of shared spectrum, but it did invite comment as
to whether they should be added. 14 4 In addition,
the NPRM did not include broadcast radio or tele-
vision licenses, which are authorized under Parts
73 and 74 of the Commission's rules. The Com-
mission reasons that these mass media licensees
raise "unique and substantial public interest con-
siderations" that preclude them from this
rulemaking. 45 Those "considerations" revolve
mainly around programming requirements and
First Amendment issues that the FCC sees as po-
tentially complicating an already difficult en-
deavor.'46 While the Commission did not invite
comment on whether such mass media broadcast
licenses should be added, it did suggest that the
leasing of such licenses may arise in the future.
47
same service" (i.e., no shared use)).
143 Id. at 24,213, para. 24 (focusing on exclusive licenses
in the NPRM because of "significant interest in leasing in this
context, and the implementation concerns are less compli-
cated than in some other services.").
144 Id. at 24,225-27, paras. 65-68 (explaining that poten-
tial for interference among "share[d] use" licenses compli-
cates leasing analysis and questioning whether leasing would
have any "practical applicability to shared spectrum"); Id. at
24,226, para. 66 (noting already existent flexibility in rules in
satellite transponder leasing and inviting comments on possi-
ble rule changes to further promote secondary markets).
145 Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,227, para.
69 n.93; Secondary Markets Policy Statement, 15 FCC Rcd. at
24,182, para. 10 n.18.
146 Secondary Markets NPM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,227, para.
69 (noting the "unique obligations placed on broadcasters
and the public interest considerations applicable in the spec-
trum assignment context"). See generally Hazlett, supra note 48
(explaining the government's regulation of spectrum as part
of an effort to control broadcast content and exploring First
Amendment implications of this regulatory scheme).
147 Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,227, para.
69 (excluding comments on mass media services and secon-
dary markets in the present rulemaking, but inviting corn-
ment on whether the Commission should address the issues
in any future rulemakings).
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1. Licensee and Lessee Rights, Responsibilities and
Compliance with Commission Rules
a. Overall Responsibility
After setting the parameters of the leasing pro-
posal, the Commission addressed the very signifi-
cant question of who should be held responsible
for ensuring lessees' compliance with the Com-
munications Act and the Commission's rules. The
Commission responded by proposing that spec-
trum licensees remain directly responsible for en-
suring lessees' compliance with the Communica-
tions Act and the Commission's various rules.
148
In cases where a licensee finds that a lessee has
violated "the parameters of the licensee's authori-
zation," the Commission proposed that the licen-
see be subject to license revocation or forfeit-
ures. 14 The Commission suggested mechanisms
such as "due diligence" inquiries to certify lessee
compliance and requiring that lease agreements
contain basic contractual definitions of each
party's rights and responsibilities with respect to
Commission rules to foster enforcement more
specifically under this leasing regime.
50
Significantly, the Commission has taken a very
similar approach in another proceeding authoriz-
ing a category of commercial licensees to lease
spectrum without prior Commission approval. In
its 700 MHz Second Report and Order, the Commis-
148 Id. at 24,214, paras. 27, 29 ("[I]n the event of licensee
or lessee non-compliance, the Commission would hold the
licensee directly responsible and may take any action against
the licensee provided for under [its] rules.").
149 Id. at 24,216, para. 32.
150 The Commission has also already used this second
contractual mechanism in its rules regarding guard band
managers, discussed immediately below. Id. at 24,215, para.
30 n.47.
15' In re Service Rules for the 746-764 and 776-794 MHz
Bands, and Revisions to Part 27 of the Commission's Rules,
Second Report and Order, 15 FCC Rcd. 5299, 5321, para. 46
(2000) [hereinafter 700 MHz Second Report and Order].
152 Any enforcement powers given to licensees must "be
designed to ensure that the licensee [has] the full authority
and duty to take whatever actions necessary to ensure the
spectrum lessee's compliance." Secondary Markets NPRM, 15
FCC Rcd. at 24,214, para. 28. The FCC touts guard band
managers as facilitators of secondary markets and as a "'next
generation' frequency coordinator," akin to the spectrum
clearinghouses of the future. 700 MHz Second Report and Or-
der, 15 FCC Rcd. at 5321, para. 45.
153 Id. at 5321, para. 46; See Comments of Verizon Wire-
less to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 00-
230, at 7-8 (Feb. 9, 2001) [hereinafter Verizon Comments to
Secondary Markets NPRM] (describing guard band managers
and reiterating their "control" standards).
sion gave new licensees, known as guard band
managers, the "full authority and the duty to take
whatever actions are necessary to ensure third-
party compliance with the [Communications] Act
and [Commission] rules."1 51 This grant of author-
ity and responsibility mirrors the language the
Commission used in the current proceeding.
15 2
This is significant because, as discussed below, the
Commission based its finding in the guard band
manager proceeding on a determination that
guard band managers retain defacto control of the
spectrum they lease.' 53 In addition, the Commis-
sion also found that it would exercise its regula-
tory authority over lessees through the guard
band managers and their nominal control over
the leased spectrum. 154 As a result, the Commis-
sion's use of the guard band manager responsibil-
ity standards and accompanying enforcement
mechanisms indicates its willingness to engage in
the same legal fiction of equating responsibility
with control in order to provide regulatory over-
sight required by Section 310(d).1
5 5
While these mechanisms and overall vesting of
responsibility in the licensee help to satisfy the re-
quirements of Section 310(d), this scheme is gen-
erally contrary to the actual relationship between
spectrum licensee and lessee; therefore, they may
serve as a disincentive to the overall leasing of
spectrum.156 Licensees will likely be deterred
154 700 MHz Second Report and Order, 15 FCC Rcd. at
5321, para. 47 (holding guard band managers directly re-
sponsible for their lessees' compliance with Communications
Act and Commission rules and enforcing the law by revoking
licenses of noncomplying guard band managers or guard
band manager lessees).
155 See Public Forum, supra note 94, at 101 (noting how
Farquhar cited the guard band manager initiative as a source
of practical experience as well as a model for secondary mar-
ket initiative).
156 See Comments of the Rural Telecommunications
Group to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 00-
230, at 12-13, 17, 18 (Feb. 9, 2001) [hereinafter RTG Com-
ments to Secondary Markets NPRM] (noting that lessees, not
licensees/lessors, maintain "operational control" of the spec-
trum and the Commission should adapt its rules to this "busi-
ness reality") (stating that holding licensees completely re-
sponsible for lessee's actions is "out of step with commercial
practice" and would "snuff out all incentives that a licensee
may have to lease its unused spectrum usage rights); Com-
ments of Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association
to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 00-230, at
9 (Feb. 9, 2001) [hereinafter CTIA Comments to Secondary Mar-
kets NPRM] (noting that the Commission's proposed enforce-
ment standards under the leasing proposal are "not feasible




from entering into lease agreements if they are re-
quired to enforce Commission rules, conduct bur-
densome "due diligence" examinations and nego-
tiate additional compliance guarantees with
potential lessees. 157 Even more daunting for licen-
sees than these potential distractions, is the possi-
ble imposition of forfeitures or license revocation
for the independent actions of a lessee that a li-
censee had no knowledge or control over.' 58 Navi-
gating this course of potential liability could result
in extremely high transaction costs, which mirror
costs under the current leasing regime that too
often preclude spectrum leasing.' 59 Together,
these possible outgrowths of the Commission's
proposed leasing scheme actually combine to
form a powerful obstacle to licensee involvement
in secondary spectrum market transactions.
b. Technical Rules
Not all of the Commission's spectrum leasing
proposal placed the regulatory responsibility on
the licensee. The Commission tentatively con-
cluded that spectrum lessees are not relieved of
their obligations to comply with the Communica-
tions Act and Commission rules.'"6 In order to en-
157 See RTG Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM, supra
note 156, at 13 (characterizing the Commission's proposal
that licensees guarantee lessee compliance as placing a "bur-
den on licensees [that] will fundamentally undermine their
willingness to lease or rent their excess spectrum"); Securicor
Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM, supra note 14, at 10
(stating that it would sometimes be more "appropriate or ex-
pedient for the Commission to act directly with the spectrum
[lessee].").
158 See RTG Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM, supra
note 156, at 13 ("Under the Commission's proposal, a licen-
see will either need to hire staff to supervise its independent
lessees or tolerate the risk of surprise forfeitures and revoca-
tions unrelated to the licensee's 'willful' acts.").
159 See CTIA Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM, supra
note 156, at 9 (noting that mandating due diligence or verifi-
cation could result in licensees indemnifying all lessees for
compliance with Commission rules).
160 Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,215, para.
31 ("[W]e tentatively conclude that this action would not re-
lieve spectrum lessees of their individual responsibilities to
comply with the Act, our policies, and our rules.").
161 Id. at 24,215-16, paras. 31-32.
162 Id. at 24,218, para. 40.
163 Id. at 24,217-18, paras. 37, 40 (having sought com-
ment on what level of direct licensee oversight of lessee com-
pliance is appropriate, the extent of licensee responsibility
over sublessees, and the appropriate role of the FCC in inter-
ference-related issues) (concluding that, where required,
licensees must apply tor and receive FCC approval of station
modifications by lessees and seeking comment on the admin-
istrative burden this requirement places on licensees).
force this distribution of responsibility, the propo-
sal extended Commission jurisdiction over
licensees to lessees and sublessees.' 6' Regarding
the Commission's technical interference and fre-
quency coordination rules, the Commission tenta-
tively concluded that lessees and sublessees must
comply with all technical rules.' 62 While the pro-
posal sought comment on how exactly licensees
may ensure lessee compliance and the appropri-
ate level of licensee oversight, 63 it also requested
comment on the "appropriate role" of lessees and
sublessees in preventing interference and ensur-
ing proper frequency coordination. 6 4 These
questions were also addressed toward technically
specific services, such as site-by-site' 6 5 and point-
to-point licenses. "",
Despite possibly trying to shift some of the re-
sponsibility to both parties for violations of the
Commission's technical rules, in order minimize
the above mentioned disincentives for spectrum
leasing, this approach perpetuates confusion and
only compounds existing disincentives to spec-
trum leasing. Parties may be forced to continue
the expensive and time-consuming process of de-
termining who is ultimately responsible for com-
pliance with technical rules and any remediation
114 Id. (having sought comment as to what extent the
lessee, rather than the licensee, should be permitted to re-
solve interference issues and enter into interference-prevent-
ing arrangements (for example, service extensions or short-
spacing agreements with other licensees)) (concluding les-
sees and sublessees should be responsible for complying with
technical rules and requesting comment on the "costs and
benefits ... associated with allowing lessees and sublessees to
be responsible for routine, day-to-day interactions with the
Commission.").
165 Id. at 24,217-18, para. 38 (sought comment on how
site-by-site licensees can comply with interference and techni-
cal rules under leasing agreements and how rules can be al-
tered to allow multiple site-by-site licensees to pool their sys-
tems, via leasing arrangements, to create larger wide-area
systems); Id. at 24,217, para. 35 n.54 (explaining that holdo-
ver licensees whose licenses covered a specific site (site-by-site
licensee) are precluded from expanding beyond their sites
into larger geographic areas that the FCC has subsequently
licensed as part of its overall shift away from site-by-site licens-
ing toward geographic area licensing).
1r(! Id. at 24,218, para. 39 (having sought comment on
leasing of spectrum for point-to-point signaling licensed
under Part 101 of the FCC's rules for private, internal com-
munications) (noting that excess spectrum "cannot be di-
vided and leased [to common carriers] without breaking the
end-to-end link"); HARRY NEWION, NEWrON's TELECOM Dic-
rIONARV 689 (16th ed. 2000) (defining point-to-point signal-
ing as a "signaling method where signals must be completely
received by an intermediate station before the station can set
up a call connection").
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efforts that may be necessary. 67 In light of this
disincentive, a more beneficial and logical ap-
proach would be to enforce technical rules di-
rectly against the party actually using the spec-
trum (generally the lessee). 168 As a result, parties
could reallocate compliance responsibility and re-
apportion liability through flexible contracts ena-
bled by their clear understanding of their respec-
tive rights. 169 Establishing a scheme of dual
responsibility serves only to negate past efforts at
clarifying spectrum users' rights. 17
0
c. Service Rules
The Commission's proposal's approach to non-
technical service rules also illustrates the conflict
between the statutory requirement of licensee
control and the Commission policy goal of free
alienation of spectrum users' rights. However, the
proposal is more flexible on this issue and may
indicate the Commission's willingness to forgo
control concerns in favor of promoting leasing
agreements. Specifically, the Commission laid out
a "continuum of possible approaches" that seeks
to strike the proper balance between control and
incentives, as it reconciles spectrum leasing with
service rules that apply to Wireless Radio Service
licensees affected by the rulemaking. 17 1 At one
end of the continuum, the Commission proposed
making all service rules applicable to lessees and
167 See RTG Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM, supra
note 156, at 25 ("Requiring licensee involvement at this level
of detail will create ... confusion and delay in the daily reso-
lution of [interference] matters; and add significant cost to
the [remediation] process.").
168 In its comments, RTG cites the enforcement of tower
lighting, painting and height restrictions against non-licensee
radio tower owners as an example of a compliance approach
that does not rely on enforcement against radio licensees
and also lightens the public's administrative responsibilites to
the Commission. RTG Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM,
supra note 156, at 19; see also CTIA Comments to Secondary Mar-
kets NPRM, supra note 156, at 8-11. The Commission could
enforce such compliance pursuant to its authority under
§ 2(a) of the Communications Act, which makes the Commu-
nications Act applicable to "all interstate and foreign commu-
nication by ... radio . . . and to all persons engaged within
the United States in such communication." 47 U.S.C.
§ 152(a) (1994).
169 See RTG Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM, supra
note 156, at 25-26; CTIA Comments to Secondary Markets
NPRM, supra note 156, at 9 (supporting freedom of parties to
enter into compliance agreements that may reallocate liabil-
ity or provide indemnification).
170 Allowing parties to freely negotiate and contract away
or enter into compliance responsibility would represent one
of the basic property ights-the right to alienate property.
licensees. 172 At the other end, it proposed estab-
lishing a different set of service rules for lessees
than licensees.' 73 Recognizing that both of these
approaches may pose obstacles to varying parties,
the Commission invited comment on how the ser-
vice rules could be redrawn and applied. 174 In
particular, the proposal focused on several non-
technical service rules that could have a substan-
tial impact on the development of secondary spec-
trum markets. 
7 5
The first of these potentially problematic rules
are the Commission's eligibility and use restric-
tions. Under the Communications Act and Com-
mission rules, certain parties are determined eligi-
ble to hold licenses, 1 76 while some licensees are
restricted in the manner in which they may use
their spectrum. 177 These restrictions pose an ob-
stacle to licensees who are barred from leasing to
other parties who may not conform to the restric-
tions. 178 In keeping with its continuum approach,
the Commission sought comment on whether to
apply the use restrictions to lessees as it did to
licensees or some variation on the rules should
exist for lessees. 179 Maintaining these service rules
would be contrary to the Commission's stated
goal of fostering a more flexible, and, in turn,
more efficient use of the spectrum. Parties cannot
put the commercially exploitable spectrum to its
highest valued use when it is blocked off and lim-
ited to only a certain use by a regulatory body.
180
See supra note 73.




174 Id. (seeking to develop a record to guide the Com-
mission in its judgment).
175 Id. at 24,218-19, paras. 41-42.
176 Some of the more significant eligibility restrictions
are the foreign ownership restrictions that prohibit foreign
interests from controlling licenses to varying degrees. See 47
U.S.C. § 310(a)-(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
177 A prime example of a use restriction is the FCC rule
limiting certain Private Land Mobile Radio Services
(PLMRS) licenses to public safety and non-communications
business uses. See 47 C.F.R. § 90.35 (2000).
178 See Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at
24,220-21, paras. 46-47 (explaining that leasing would be re-
stricted only to lessees that would themselves qualify for a li-
cense under the rules if the use restrictions were expanded
to lessees as currently applied to licensees).
17) Id. (laying out proposals).
180 See Furtchgott-Roth, supra note 7, at 14 ("The Com-
mission should never dictate a single business model or a sin-
gle technology. By locking in one model, such designations




Arguments asserting that the government has a
duty to impose restrictions blocking off spectrum
for public safety and national defense purposes
are relatively reasonable, even after a more accu-
rate picture is painted of the scarcity doctrine, be-
cause the government presumably knows the
needs of it own spectrum users better than any-
one else.' 8" However, the government's credibility
is severely limited when extending use restrictions
on spectrum to certain commercial applications
because the Commission can never hope to be as
responsive to the demands of the market as those
players comprising the market itself. 18 2 As a re-
sult, restrictions may only be appropriate in the
narrowest of instances where the service is geared
toward public safety or national defense."'
The next set of service rules deal with a party's
ability to acquire a license in a given market based
on the amount of spectrum or control of spec-
trum that can be attributed to that party in the
same market. ' 8 4 One such attribution rule of par-
ticular significance is the CMRS spectrum aggre-
gation limit, also known as the CMRS spectrum
cap. Under the CMRS spectrum cap rule, the
amount of broadband CMRS spectrum that an en-
tity can hold within a particular geographic mar-
181 See White, supra note 40, at 31 (positing that, while
even government agencies should be forced to bid on spec-
trum in the open market, these agencies are well positioned
to seek out efficient uses of the spectrum given their constitu-
ents' ability to voice the public's preferences).
182 Use restrictions are the classic example of what for-
mer Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth describes as the govern-
ment skewing the spectrum market by assuming the role of a
market participant that exercises inappropriate market
power by blocking entrance into certain areas. Furchtgott-
Roth's Statement to Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at
24,259-60.
183 Requiring both licensees and lessees to conform to
foreign ownership rules would be in keeping with the recog-
nition of the government's limited, but appropriate role in
the spectrum market described here.
184 Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,221, para.
48 (noting use of attribution rules to determine eligibility for
auction bidding credits and the CMRS spectrum cap).
185 47 C.F.R. § 20.6 (2000)
No licensee in the broadband PCS, cellular, or SMR ser-
vices (including all parties under common control) reg-
ulated as CMRS... shall have an attributable interest in
a total of more than 45 MHz of licensed broadband PCS,
cellular and SMR spectrum regulated as CMRS with sig-
nificant overlap in any geographic area, except that in
Rural Service Areas (RSAs) ... no licensee shall have an
attributable interest in a total of more than 55 MHz of
licensed broadband PCS, cellular, and SMR spectrum
regulated as CMRS with significant overlap in any RSA.
Id. at § 20.6.
186 See In re 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review Spectrum
ket is limited to 45 MHz of spectrum or 55 MHz in
rural markets.8 5 The purpose of the rule is to
prevent unfair and anti-competitive market con-
centration of spectrum.' 8 6 As discussed below, the
CMRS spectrum cap is closely intertwined with
the transfer of control issue. 18 7 The question the
CMRS spectrum cap poses for secondary markets
is whether leased spectrum should be attributable
to the licensee, lessee or both. 88
The Secondary Markets NPRM sought comment
on each of these approaches and how each would
effect CMRS market concentration and the devel-
opment of spectrum leasing transactions. 8 9
Under a strict standard of de facto control, leased
spectrum would still be attributable to the licen-
see even though primarily used by the lessee.190
This occurrence would present one of the strong-
est disincentives for licensees to lease their excess
spectral capacity, as they would be unable to use
spectrum still being attributed to them. 9" Alter-
natively, lessees would be deterred if leased spec-
trum were applied to them because they would
see their opportunities limited by a regulation
supposedly aimed at enhancing their market par-
ticipation. 92 Short of eliminating the CMRS spec-
trum cap, the next best alternative is to continue
Aggregation Limits for Commercial Mobile Radio Services,
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, in WT Dkt. No. 01-14, FCC 01-
28, para. 1 (Jan. 23, 2001), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
Bureaus/Wireless/Notices/2001/fcc0l028.txt [hereinafter
Spectrum Cap NPARM] (finding spectrum limits "necessary to
safeguard competition in CMRS markets.").
187 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
188 See Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at
24,221-22, para. 49.
189 Id. (continuing to advance a continuum of possible
approaches for comment).
191 In its comments to the Secondary Markets NPRM,
AT&T Wireless recognized that, under the Commission's
leasing proposal, attribution of spectrum for the purposes of
the CMRS spectrum cap should "follow the entity that is re-
sponsible for control of the license." Comments of AT&T
Wireless Services, Inc. to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
WT Dkt. No. 00-230, at 5-6 (Feb. 9, 2001) [hereinafter
AT&T Wireless Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM] (stating
that it would sometimes be more appropriate or expedient
for the spectrum lessee to interact directly with the Commis-
sion).
I'll See CTIA Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM, supra
note 156, at 8 ("[I]t makes no sense to attribute spectrum,
for purposes of the [CMRS] spectrum cap, to parties that
lack the ability to use such spectrum to exercise market
power ... it reduces incentives for licensees to lease their
unused spectrum.").
192 See Comments of Cingular Wireless LLC to the Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 00-230, at 5 (Feb. 9,
2001) [hereinafter Cingular Comments to Secondary Markets
NPRM] ("Excluding spectrum used by lessees from the
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applying the CMRS spectrum cap only to the
licensees it was intended to restrain; however, it
should allow them to exceed the CMRS spectrum
cap when a long-term lease commits excess spec-
trum. 1
9 3
Closely related to the CMRS spectrum cap in its
reliance on attribution principles, the Commis-
sion's unjust enrichment rules also present a chal-
lenge to the development of secondary markets.
Under Commission rules, bidding credits for
small businesses are sometimes awarded in partic-
ular auction proceedings.' 94 Installment payment
plans also have been made available to winning
applicants in selected auctions.' 95 Under the cur-
rent unjust enrichment rules, a licensee that re-
ceived bidding credits or benefited from install-
ment payments and leases its spectrum to a party
not eligible for those same benefits must repay
the government the profit realized by exploiting
the government's largess.' 96 The Commission
asked for comment on whether the rule should be
maintained, altered or eliminated.1 97 For propos-
als to alter or eliminate the rule, the Commission
sought comment on what mechanisms' could re-
place the existing system.' 98
The final set of service rules that would impact
significantly any spectrum leasing proposal is the
Commission's construction and service require-
ments, or "build-out" requirements. Under au-
thority granted in the Communications Act, the
Commission has adopted rules that require licen-
sees to construct, or build-out, its facilities to suffi-
ciently serve a geographic area or population
within a certain period of time.199-  The Commis-
sion proposed applying the build-out require-
[CMRS spectrum] cap would foster more of an open entry
environment in numerous markets and introduce additional
competitors.").
193 As discussed later in this comment, as well as in most
of the comments to the Secondary Markets NPRM, the CMRS
spectrum cap is no longer necessary in today's competitive
wireless marketplace and should be eliminated. See discussion
infra Part IV.B.2.
194 Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,222, para.
52.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 24,222-23, para. 53 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 1.2111
(d) (2000)).
197 Id. at 24,223, para. 53.
198 Id.
199 47 U.S.C. § 303(b), (h) (granting the Commission
the authority to impose build-out requirements); see, e.g., 47
C.F.R. §§ 90.665, 90.685 (2000).
200 Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,222, para.
50.
ments of spectrum lessees to count toward the re-
quirements expected of licensees under the build-
out rules.2 0 0 This would certainly benefit licensees
required to meet specific build-out goals, and
thus, serve to promote spectrum leasing.2°11 How-
ever, the contradiction presented by the possible
attribution of leased spectrum to lessees for
CMRS spectrum cap purposes would represent a
clear asymmetry in policies. 21 1 2 The Commission
sought comment on the proposal, as well as alter-
native proposals that may be equally efficient.
2. Transfer of Control Issues
a. The Commission's New Standard for Control:
No Pre-Approval Necessary
Although lessees may operate the transmission
equipment on the spectrum, by effectively hold-
ing spectrum licensees fully responsible for com-
pliance with Commission rules, the Commission's
leasing proposal created the legal fiction that the
licensee maintains defacto control over the leased
spectrum. The Commission uses this fiction to
conclude that allowing licenses to lease spectrum
in accordance with the leasing proposal and with-
out prior Commission approval would not violate
Section 310(d) because it does not constitute a de
facto transfer of control of the license or facili-
ties.2°11 As a result, the Commission tentatively
concluded that the strict six-prong Intermountain
Microwave standard is no longer appropriate for
determining whether a lease or other alienation
of spectrum users' rights constitutes an unautho-
rized de facto transfer of control 114 According to
201 See Cingular Comments to Seconday Markets NPRM,
supra note 192, at 4; RTG Comments to Secondary Markets
NPRM, supra note 156, at 28; Securicor Wireless Comments to Sec-
onday Markets NPRM, supra note 14, at 13; Comments of
Cook Inlet Region, Inc. to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
WT Dkt. No. 00-230, at 10 (Feb. 9, 2001) [hereinafter Cook
Inlet Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM].
202 It is the stated goal of Congress to move away from
asymmetrical regulation. See discussion infra note 280.
203 Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,232, para.
79.
204 The Commission concluded that the Intermountain
Microwave standard is no longer appropriate or viable as a
regulatory tool in today's wireless marketplace where market
forces and regulatory flexibility have been infused through
such policies as spectrum auctioning and the assignment of
licenses in blocks of spectrum over geographic areas. Id. at
24,230-31, paras. 74-76. Commentators to the proceeding
overwhelmingly concurred with this conclusion.
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the Commission, the continued use of the Inter-
mountain Microwave standard would impede spec-
trum leasing because it too narrowly focuses on
the operation of the station then to whether the
license is being efficiently used and in sync with
Commission policies and rules.2°1 5 The Commis-
sion tentatively concluded that a new standard is
necessary as an alternative to the Intermountain Mi-
crowave standard.
206"
The Commission's proposed new standard is
based on the fiction of licensee control employed
to circumvent Section 310(d), and therefore, it is
more capable of promoting the policy goal of sec-
ondary markets. Specifically, the proposed stan-
dard would require a licensee entering into a leas-
ing agreement to:
(1) retain full responsibility for compliance with the
[Communications] Act and [Commission] rules
with regard to any use of licensed spectrum by any
lessee or sublessee;
(2) certify that each spectrum lessee (or sublessee)
meets all applicable eligibility requirements and
complies with all applicable technical and service
rules;
(3) retain full authority to take all actions necessary in
the event of noncompliance, including the right to
suspend or terminate the lessee's operations if
such operations do not comply with the [Commu-
nications] Act or Commissions rules.
2 0 7
This new standard of control places the regula-
tory burden on the licensee and imposes strict re-
quirements on contracting parties. 20s Such an ap-
proach creates a clear unwillingness among
licensees to enter into leasing agreements. 2 1 1
205 The Commission also noted that the Intermountain
Microwave standard ignores such contractual provisions be-
tween potential spectrum lessors and lessees as put forth
under the Commission spectrum leasing proposal. /d. at
24,231, para. 76.
206 Id. at 24,231-32, para. 78 (proposing to develop a
new standard "in lieu" of Intermountain Microwave); see also
CTIA Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM, supra note 156, at
12 (citing Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1992))
(stating that the Commission is obligated to evaluate its previ-
ous policy decisions over time, determine whether they still
serve their intended purpose and amend them if they are no
longer relevant).
207 Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,232, para.
79.
218 See CTIA Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM, supra
note 156, at 14 (noting that the proposed standard lacks the
flexibility necessary for parties to structure marketplace
leases and should be liberalized); RTG Comments to Secondary
Markets NPRM, supra note 156, at 22 (asserting that the new
standard simply reiterates Intermountain Microwave's "day-to-
day" oversight requirement of licensees without maintaining
the other incidents of control).
209 As discussed previously, holding licensees fully re-
sponsible for lessees' actions will diminish incentives to lease
Also, the proposal may retard the growth of sec-
ondary markets with its restrictive and intrusive
nature.2 1 Ironically, however, the legitimacy of
this standard may be threatened by the liberal ap-
proach it has taken to establishing the grounds
for its authority.
As noted above, Congress did not define "con-
trol" in the Communications Act. 21I Under Chev-
ron, this omission entitles the FCC to broad discre-
tion in interpreting the term "control. ' 21 2 This
relatively free reign has allowed the Commission
to develop its several tests for control. 21 " However,
this discretion is not unlimited. Chevron also holds
that an agency's definition will not be respected if
deemed arbitrary, capricious or manifestly con-
trary to the statute.21 4 While courts generally have
upheld the Commission's application of its chang-
ing control standards to date, 21 5 some courts have
overruled recent Commission interpretations of
other undefined or vague statutory language.
In Association of Communications Enterprises v.
FCC,2 16 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia struck down a Commission defini-
tion used in a similar situation to the definition of
"control" in the Secondary Markets NPRM.2 17 In
Ass'n of Communications Enterprises, the FCC re-
lieved, as part of a merger condition, an affiliate
of SBC Communications from market-opening
obligations that Section 251 of the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996 [hereinafter "Telecom Act"]
imposes on incumbent local exchange carriers
spectrum, thereby slowing the development of efficiency-
seeking secondary markets. See discussion supra notes 156-59;
see also Comments of Winstar Communications, Inc. to the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 00-230, at 10-11
(Feb. 9, 2001 ) [hereinafter Winstar Comments to Secondary Mar-
kets NPRM].
210 See CTIA Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM, supra
note 156, at 14-15.
211 See H.R. REio. No. 73-1850, at 4-5 (1934).
212 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (finding that congressional
silence or ambiguity equates to an express delegation of au-
thority to the agency to supplement or clarify the statutory
language by way of regulation).
213 See LorainJournal Co., 351 U.S. at 828-29 (interpret-
ing the FCC's authority broadly to confirm an agency's ability
to develop varying standards of control, depending on the
circumstance).
214 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
215 See Tele. and Data Sys., Inc., 19 F.3d at 49 (upholding
Commission's ability to alter its control standards when done
so with a reasoned explanation, but reversing the agency's
uneven application of those standards).
21( 235 F.3d 662 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
217 Id. at 663.
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(ILECs), such as SBC, and their "successors and
assigns." 2 18 The Commission exempted the affili-
ate by defining "successors and assigns" to not in-
clude affiliates.2 19 The court essentially found the
Commission's definition of "successors and as-
signs" to be unreasonable and an attempt at "cir-
cumvent[ing] the statutory scheme."220 The court
made this determination by looking at the overall
structure of the Telecom Act and finding that the
Commission's definition of "successors and as-
signs" was manifestly contrary to the Telecom
Act's intended goal of promoting competition.
2 2 1
When comparing the Commission's actions in
Ass'n of Communications Enterprises with its new
standard for control developed in the secondary
markets proposal, potential problems emerge for
the new standard. Like the Commission's defini-
tion of "successors and assigns," the Commission's
definition of control under the new standard may
produce results that contradict the basic intent of
the underlying statute. As Hazlett and others have
pointed out, the purpose of the Communications
Act was to supplant common law private property
rights in spectrum with empowering a licensing
commission to act as spectrum administrator.
222
The Commission's control standard, however, is
part of a process that is geared toward reversing
that statutory design. As the D.C. Circuit's deci-
218 Id. at 663-65 (reciting facts of the case).
219 The affiliate was engaged solely in providing ad-
vanced telecommunications services. Id. at 664-66.
220 Id. at 666.
221 The court held that because Congress did not author-
ize affiliate structures for advanced services, it must not have
intended for § 251's market-opening obligations to be
avoided by the use of an affiliate. As a result, the court found
the Commission's use of its successor and assign definition to
be "a form of legal jujitsu to justify its relaxation of § 251 (c)'s
restrictions" and an unreasonable exercise of authority. Id.
667-68.
222 Hazlett, supra note 48, at 924 (embracing the view of
one of the Communication Act's congressional architects,
U.S. Senator Clarence C. Dill).
223 Commentators to the Secondary Markets NPRM over-
whelmingly acknowledge the new proposed control stan-
dard's compliance with the requirements of § 310(d), with
some finding it too strict. See CTIA Comments to Secondary Mar-
kets NPRM, supra note 156, at 13-14; Securicor Comments to Sec-
ondary Markets NPRM, supra note 14, at 15; Winstar Comments
to Secondary Markets NPRM, supra note 209, at 9; Comments of
Sprint Corporation to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT
Dkt. No. 00-230, at 2 (Feb. 9, 2001) [hereinafter Sprint Com-
ments to Secondary Markets NPRM] (citing the ability of ITFS
and guard band managers to lease without prior FCC ap-
proval as proof that the Secondary Markets NPRM leasing pro-
posal poses no significant legal issues).
224 It is important to note that the FCC's new proposed
sion in Ass'n of Communications Enterprises illus-
trates, such a reversal must come by statutory al-
teration, not the alteration of agency policy.
However, the Commission's proposed standard
for license control is unlikely to be found unrea-
sonable or manifestly contrary to the Communica-
tions Act at this time.22 3 As the Commission's in-
tention, and as noted above, to confer of full
responsibility on licensees, in the Secondary Mar-
kets NPRM, manufactures a fiction that saves it
from this fate.2 2 4 Yet, this is not to say that the in-
fusion of further flexibility and greater property
rights will not present this issue to the Commis-
sion in future deliberations on whether to amend
or even abolish standards of control.
Even with a standard of government spectrum
control solidly within the Communications Act's
intent, the Commission's proposed standard is
not completely clear of Chevron's prohibitions. By
adopting yet another standard for control and not
applying it evenly in every circumstance, the Com-
mission's decision may be deemed arbitrary and
capricious and the standard unreasonable. 225 As
Cingular Wireless pointed out in its comments to
the Secondary Markets NPRM, "it would . . .make
little sense to apply completely different control
tests within the same service depending upon
standard of control employs a fiction of licensee control simi-
lar to one already exhibited in lease-like agreements in the
broadcast arena. In radio industry joint ventures known as
time brokerage agreements (TBAs), a licensee may sell
blocks of time on its station to a "broker" (that is lessee) who
then supplies programming at that time over the licensee's
facilities, sells the commercials for that time and collects and
keeps the proceeds. A similar arrangement known as a local
marketing agreement (LMA) exists in the television industry.
See In re Citicasters Co., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture,
File No. 00-IH-0283, DA 01-344, at para. 2 n.4 (Feb. 13, 2001)
[hereinafter Citicasters]. These arrangements are essentially
spectrum leases. While licensees cannot relinquish as much
actual control as wireless licensees, under the Commission's
spectrum leasing proposal, a licensee essentially hands real
control of its spectrum to a lessee and complies with § 310 (d)
by taking ultimate responsibility for compliance. See Citicas-
ters, at para. 8 (noting that improper transfers of control are
determined by measuring how much authority a licensee
concedes in the three areas forming the locus of control of a
broadcast station: programming, personnel and finances).
225 See Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,231,
para. 77 ("In our [the Commission's] discussion of Intermoun-
tain Microwave in this NPRM, we [the Commission] neither
address, nor propose to limit, the use of the Intermountain
Microwave standard in contexts other than spectrum leas-
ing.") (noting that the Intermountain Microwave standard will
still be applied when interpreting the spectrum aggregation
and cellular cross-ownership rules).
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whether spectrum leasing is involved."2 26 Such a
diversity of approaches would only be confusing
and perpetuate the regulatory uncertainty the sec-
ondary markets initiative is intended to reverse.
227
Aside from possibly straying too far from the
language and intent of the Communications Act
by proposing overly confining rules, the proposed
standard presents another irony by threatening
the efficacy of another Commission rule aimed at
promoting competition, namely the CMRS spec-
trum cap. In another proceeding, the Commis-
sion is currently considering whether it should
eliminate, amend or maintain the CMRS spec-
trum cap.2 28 Opponents of the CMRS spectrum
cap assert that it is no longer necessary in light of
the extremely competitive CMRS marketplace 2"9
and alternative means of restraining anti-competi-
tive behavior. 2- ° Among the alternative means of
restraining anti-competitive behavior, the most
often alternative mean cited is the case-by-case re-
view required for license transfers under Section
310(d). 23' However, if a growing number of spec-
trum transactions do not receive review under
Section 310(d), this potential alternative to the
CMRS spectrum cap will no longer exist for all
practical purposes. 232 The most effective way to
resolve this issue is to eliminate the CMRS spec-
226 Cingular Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM, supra
note 192, at 12 (discussing policy asymmetry).
227 Id.
228 Spectrum Cap NPRM, supra note 186.
229 See CTIA Comments to Secondary Markets NPRMV, supra
note 156, at 6 n.13 (citing Spectrum Cap NPRM, para.14)
(describing competitive state of marketplace); Beckwith,
supra note 92, at 380 (stating that competition has made the
CMRS spectrum cap unnecessary).
230 Commentators to the Secondary Markets NPRM have
explained that the role of the CMRS spectrum cap should be
filled by case-by-case enforcement options available under
Department of justice and Federal Trade Commission anti-
trust review, the anti-monopolization provisions of the Com-
munications Act, and the public interest requirements in
§ 310(d). CTIA Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM, supra
note 156, at 6 n.14; see also Comments of Bell Atlantic Mobile,
Inc. to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in VT Dkt. No. 98-
205, at 11 (Jan. 25, 1999) (noting that potential market con-
centration in a given service area could be reversed by the
Commission enlarging the amount of spectrum in the area
by allocating more bandwidth). Commentators have also
stressed that the CMRS spectrum cap could delay the deploy-
ment of third generation (3G) wireless services as wireless
providers have a limited amount of spectrum to meet the ex-
pected demand. AT&T Wireless Comments to Secondary Markets
NPRM, supra note 190, at 6-7.
231 CTIA Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM, supra note
156, at 6 n.14 (including the case-by-case enforcement op-
tions available under the public interest requirements in
trum cap altogether and rely on the multitude of
other enforcement options to guard against mar-
ket concentration. By eliminating the CMRS spec-
trum cap, a major disincentive to spectrum leas-
ing would be removed for both licensees and
lessees and the Commission's end goal of promot-
ing competition would still be effectively
served.
2- 3
b. Modified Commission Approval
For those who believe any type of spectrum leas-
ing agreement requires Commission approval
under Section 310(d), regardless of Commission
requirements, the Secondary Markets NPRM invited
comment on two alternatives that would enable
leasing agreements. 2 -3 4 First, the Secondary Markets
NPRM proposed that the Commission make a
blanket determination that transfers of control
that comply with the Commission's rules for leas-
ing arrangements are in the public interest and
should be automatically granted because they
meet the Section 310(d) public interest require-
ment.2-3 5 The Commission has used blanket deter-
minations in the past to overcome separate SMR
end user licensing and satellite earth stations li-
censing requirements.2 36 The Seconday Markets
§ 310(d) in the suite of mechanisms for ensuring competitive
markets); see also Beckwith, supra note 92, at 388-91 (citing
license case-by-case review of transfers of control under
§ 310(d) as possible mechanism to prevent anti-competitive
market developments).
232 Spectrum Cap NPRM, supra note 186, at para. 19 n.70
(recognizing no-approval spectrum leasing's elimination of a
potential alternative to the spectrum cap and inviting com-
ment on alternative means of ensuring competition).
233 See discussion supra notes 190-92. Licensees are de-
terred by the prospect of having spectrum attributed to them
that they do not control, while lessees view the CMRS spec-
trum cap as another regulation hindering their actions in a
prospective market.
2 4 Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,332-33,
para. 81 (noting the view that § 310(d) requires FCC pre-ap-
proval of spectrum leases).
235 This proposal is based on the fact that spectrum leas-
ing in itself is in the public interest. Id.
236 See In re Amendment of Part 90 of the Commission's
Rules to Eliminate Separate Licensing of End Users of Spe-
cialized Mobile Radio Systems, Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd.
5558, para. 1(1992) [hereinafter Part 90 Report and Order]; In.
re Redesignation of the 17.7-19.7 GHz Frequency Band,
Blanket Licensing of Satellite Earth Stations in the 17.7-20.2
GHz and 27.5-30.0 GHz Frequency Bands, and the Alloca-
tion of Additional Spectrum in the 17.3-17.8 GHz and
24.75-25.25 GHz Frequency Bands for Broadcast Satellite-
Service Use, Report and Order, 15 FCC Rcd. 13,430, para. 1
(2000).
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NPRM supplemented the blanket determination
approach by also proposing the use of "short
form" notification procedures in the transfer ap-
proval process. 237 The FCC has used these short
form notification procedures in the past when it
implemented pro forma assignments and transfers
of telecommunications licenses to approve such li-
cense transfers.2 38 Together, the blanket determi-
nation and the short form notification represent a
form of modified Commission approval.
Despite seeming to dodge the transfer of con-
trol issue, modified approval by the Commission
runs foul of Section 310 (d) in two important ways.
First, it is clear that Section 310(d) requires that
transfers of control be determined on a case-by-
case basis. 239 A blanket determination by the
Commission that all spectrum leases complying
with FCC rules are within the public interest di-
rectly contradicts this requirement. The examples
of blanket determinations that the Commission
cites in its proposal of the modified approval ap-
proach do not deal with Section 310(d). Also,
while short form notice would seem to provide
the fiction of case-by-case FCC approval, which
blanket determinations lack on their own, short
form notice still would not constitute true case-by-
case approval because the applications would es-
sentially be approved even before they are submit-
ted. Such an approach would surely run into the
type of Chevron problems discussed above. Moreo-
ver, in providing support for the use of short form
notices, the Commission cited a proceeding
where it had already invoked its forbearance au-
thority prior to requiring short form notices.2'"4
This fact demonstrates that the notice is essen-
tially a ministerial mechanism that does not allow
for the real exercise of Commission control, and
would therefore violate Section 310(d).
237 Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,232-33,
para. 81.
238 See generally In re Federal Communications Bar Associ-
ation's Petition for Forbearance from Section 310(d) of the
Communications Act Regarding Non-Substantial Assign-
ments of Wireless Licenses and Transfers of Control Involv-
ing Telecommunications Carriers and Personal Communica-
tions Industry Association's Broadband Personal
Communications Services Alliance's Petition for Forbearance
For Broadband Personal Communications Services, Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 6293, para. 2 (1998)
[hereinafter FCBA's Petition for Forbearance].
239 See Beckwith, supra note 92, at 374-75 (stating that
§ 310(d) requires a Commission review of assignments and
c. Utilizing § 10(a) Forbearance Authority
Where one finds that section 310(d) requires
FCC approval and modified approval insufficient,
the Secondary Markets NPRM invited further com-
ment on the possibility of the FCC using its for-
bearance authority under the Communications
Act, as amended by the Telecom Act, to avoid the
requirements of Section 310(d). 24 1 While forbear-
ance is the last of the alternative proposals the
Commission recommended, it is actually the best
suited to promote secondary markets, and there-
fore, should be the Commission's primary propo-
sal. Unlike its no-approval and modified approval
proposals, forbearance does not require the Com-
mission to sacrifice its overall policy goal of clarify-
ing spectrum users' rights in order to satisfy an
inflexible requirement of control. Section 310(d)
and its accompanying confusion would be re-
moved under a forbearance approach, as the
Commission could more freely apportion respon-
sibility according to who is actually operating on
the spectrum and not who holds the license.
2 42
Under Section 10(a) of the Telecom Act, the
FCC may forbear from enforcing other sections of
the Communications Act, against a telecommuni-
cations carrier or service or a class of telecommu-
nications carriers or services if: 1) enforcement is
not necessary to ensure that charges, practices,
classifications, or regulations are just and reasona-
ble and are not unjustly or unreasonably discrimi-
natory; 2) enforcement is not necessary to protect
consumers; and 3) forbearance would be consis-
tent with the public interest.2 43 If forbearance
were invoked, most of the exclusive Wireless Com-
munications Services affected by the Secondary
Markets NPRM qualify as telecommunications ser-
vices and could potentially be relieved from the
transfer applications on a "case-by-case basis.").
24(1 FCBA's Petition for Forbearance, 13 FCC Rcd. at
6306-07, para. 24 (finding that forbearance from § 310(d)'s
requirements for pro forma transactions is consistent with
the public interest).
241 Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,233, para.
82 (offering forbearance as an alternative to the no prior ap-
proval and modified approval proposals).
242 By forbearing, the Commission would be saving itself,
as well as licensees from confusing and costly control stan-
dards. See Cingular Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM, supra
note 192, at 11.
243 47 U.S.C. § 160 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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requirements of section 310(d). 2 44 Upon applica-
tion of the test, the Commission's spectrum leas-
ing proposal satisfied this forbearance test.
With respect to the first prong of the forbear-
ance test, prior FCC approval of spectrum leasing
agreements is not necessary to ensure that licen-
sees' charges, practices, classifications, and ser-
vices are just and reasonable nor unreasonably
discriminatory.2 45 The high level of competition
in the fixed and mobile wireless marketplace is
such that charges and practices are sure to remain
market driven and beneficial to consumers. 246 In
addition, the introduction of spectrum leasing
and secondary markets will only result in more
wireless competition to ensure just and reasona-
ble service. 24 7 Furthermore, by making the licen-
see directly accountable to the Commission and
fully responsible for ensuring compliance of the
Commission's rules, the Commission maintains
the ability to check unjust or unreasonable
charges or practices.2
48
As with the first prong of the forbearance test,
the protection of consumers under the second
prong is also ensured by existing and future com-
petition in the wireless marketplace and the licen-
see's direct accountability to the Commission.
The protection of consumers from objectionable
lessee actions provided by Section 310(d) ap-
proval may also be effectively replaced by the con-
tinued ability of aggrieved consumers to file peti-
tions to deny license renewals.
24
9
With respect to the third prong of the test, for-
244 As discussed below, not all the licenses effected by
the Secondary Markets NPRM would be eligible for § 10(a) for-
bearance. See discussion infra notes 249-50.
245 See Cingular Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM,
supra note 192, at 12 (endorsing forbearance approach to
justifying spectrum leasing proposal and finding that it meets
all three prongs of the forbearance test); CTIA Comments to
Secondary Markets NPRM, supra note 156, at 16 (finding leas-
ing proposal meets all three prongs of forbearance test).
246 The highly competitive wireless marketplace is the
most effective deterrent to CMRS carriers charging rates or
engaging in practices that are unjustly or unreasonably dis-
criminatory. See Cingular Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM,
supra note 192, at 12-13 (quoting In re Wireless Consumers
Alliance, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd.
17,021, para. 21 (2000) reconsideration denied, FCC No. 01-35,
WTB (Jan. 31, 2001); CTIA Comments to Secondary Markets
IVPRM, supra note 156, at 16 (citing Spectrum Cap NPRM,
para. 18).
247 See Cingular Comments to Secondary Markets NPIM,
supra note 192, at 12 (citing In re Implementation of Section
6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993:
Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Condi-
tions With Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, Fifth Ie-
bearance from applying section 310(d) to spec-
trum leasing is clearly consistent with the public
interest. As the Commission has noted, spectrum
leasing will foster the development of secondary
markets that will encourage the efficient spectrum
use that enables wider and more sophisticated ex-
ploitation of the spectrum for the benefit of the
general public. 250 When this finding is combined
with the preceding two prongs of Section 10(a)'s
test, forbearance from applying Section 310(d) is
justified.
Forbearance does present some challenges to
the overall secondary markets movement, yet it
does not diminish its superiority to the Commis-
sion's other proposals. As noted, section 10(a)
grants the Commission forbearance authority
over a "telecommunications carrier or telecom-
munications service, or class of telecommunica-
tion carriers or telecommunications services."25
1
Telecommunications carriers are essentially de-
fined as providers of telecommunications services
and treated as common carriers under the Com-
munications Act.252 Telecommunications service
is "the offering of telecommunications for a fee
directly to the public."2 53 Under these definitions,
all of the exclusive Wireless Radio Services af-
fected by the Secondary Markets NPRM are eligible
for forbearance, except Private Land Mobile Ra-
dio Services (PLMRS). By definition, PLMRS does
not offer service directly to the public for a fee,
rather it is only allowed to use the spectrum for its
own private purposes. 2 5 4 As a result, PLMRS can-
port, 15 FCC Rcd. 17,660 (2000)).
248 The argument against the leasing proposal is not that
it frustrates accountability, as is the issue here, only that it
may retard investment and economic creativity. See Cingular
Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM, supra note 192, at 12;
CTIA Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM, supra note 156, at
16.
249 See Cingular Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM,
supra note 192, at 13.
250 See Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,210,
para. 18; see also Secondary Markets Policy Statement, 15 FCC
Rcd. at 24,186, para. 19; Hatfield, supra note 5 (noting that
secondary markets will give existing licensees incentive to em-
ploy more spectrally efficient technologies in order to lease
spectrum surpluses they create).
251 47 U.S.C. § 160(a).
252 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (defin-
ing telecommunications carrier).
253'-' 47 U.S.C. § 153 (46) (defining telecommunications
service).
254 47 C.F.R. § 90.35 (2000) (defining PLMRS); see also
Seconday Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,220, para. 46
("[L]icensees in certain PLMRS bands are limited to non-
commercial use of the spectrum, that is, licensees may use
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not be considered a telecommunications service
for the purposes of Section 10(a) forbearance.
However, in the aggregate, the application of the
Commission's proposed control standard to
PLMRS would only slightly diminish the certainty,
flexibility and efficiency gains realized by forbear-
ing from enforcing Section 310(d) against other
commercial Wireless Radio Services.
The limitation of Section 10(a) to telecommu-
nications carriers or services also presents a chal-
lenge to the future of secondary markets that the
Secondary Markets NPRM alluded to by excluding
broadcast spectrum use from the scope of the pro-
ceeding. 255 Desiring to maintain their high level
of control over what are considered powerfully in-
vasive content-delivering mediums, Congress and
the FCC have not developed a forbearance mech-
anism similar to Section 10(a) for radio and tele-
vision broadcast.2 56 While this fact would not pre-
sent an obstacle to the present rulemaking
proceeding, it would hinder future proceedings
seeking to extend spectrum leasing to broadcast
licenses. As with PLMRS, the efficiency gains real-
ized from applying a more flexible standard of
control to broadcasters would not equal, but be
considerable to those achieved through forbear-
ance from enforcing Section 310(d). However,
secondary markets must be allowed to develop in
broadcast, non-broadcast and every use in be-
tween if the most efficient allocation of spectrum
is ever to be achieved. 25 7 Ultimately, amendment
of the Communications Act will be necessary to
provide the Commission with the authority to for-
bear from enforcing Section 310(d) against
broadcasters, as it currently allows for telecommu-
nications services under Section 10(a). 25 8
spectrum on a private internal use basis, but may not offer
wireless service on a commercial basis to others."); Id. at
24,220, para. 46 n.61 (noting that the commercial/noncom-
mercial distinction is the basis for the differences in regula-
tory treatment between private and commercial wireless ser-
vices).
255 Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,227, para.
69; see also supra notes 69-70 for discussion.
256 Proforma transfers are allowed, but not under any for-
bearance authority. See In re 1998 Biennial Regulatory Re-
view-Streamlining of Mass Media Applications, Rules, and
Processes, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 13 FCC Rcd. 11,349,
11,376-77, paras. 74-77 (1998).
257 Including broadcast licenses in the secondary mar-
kets initiative, whether through forbearance or a relaxed
control standard, will be difficult given the vocal advocacy of
policymakers seeking to maintain content control. See Tris-
tani's Statement to Secondary Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at
While not perfect, forbearance from section
310(d) is the best way to allow secondary markets
to evolve. By removing Section 310(d), forbear-
ance eliminates the need for the legal fiction of
licensee control and its accompanying complica-
tions.259 The Commission then no longer must
balance control against flexibility and can allow
parties to contract more confidently and freely
with user rights that are clearly defined. The end
result of forbearance from Section 310(d)is spec-
trum put to its most valued use to more accurately
meet the demands of our society.
V. SECONDARY MARKETS AND
FORBEARANCE: PREREQUISITES TO
THE SPECTRUM EXCHANGES OF THE
FUTURE
A. Technology Driving the Market and Policy
The secondary markets initiative is the next
stage in the evolutionary development of spec-
trum policy that has been marked to date by the
growing infusion of greater property rights into
the spectrum licensing system. Influenced largely
by the work of such law and economics theorists
as Coase and Posner, 2 6 1 policymakers have acted
on this liberalization of rights to adopt such mar-
ket-based assignment mechanisms as auctions and
spectrum leasing. As a result, this movement has
allowed spectrum users to more accurately dis-
cern the value of the spectrum and use it more
efficiently. However, like in most aspects of the
modern world, technology has provided a series
of catalytic events that have continually pushed
24,262 (objecting to mentioning of broadcast licenses in Sec-
ondary Markets NPRM and stressing that any discussion of
broadcast licenses must include licensees' public interest re-
sponsibility to provide for localism and diversity in its ser-
vice).
258 As the courts have indicated, the FCC must have ex-
press statutory authority to forbear from provisions of the
Act. See generally MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S.
218 (1994); Ass'n of Communications Enter. v. FCC, 235
F.3d 662 (2001).
259 At the Public Forum, Motorola Vice President Rich
Barth stated that the Commission could begin the process of
fostering spectrum leasing and secondary markets by taking
away the "bureaucratic hire 50 lawyers to get it done pro-
cess," thereby leaving a "more user-friendly system." See Public
Forum, supra note 94, at 115.




such theoretical movements and altered the
course of spectrum's evolutionary process.
From the early advancements in the technology
that led to the explosion of radio use and even-
tual regulation in the 1920's to the rise of cellular
systems and their siphoning of any available fre-
quency bands, technological developments have
dramatically changed the wireless economic and
regulatory landscape.2 6 1 The technological devel-
opment most likely to reshape spectrum markets
and policy in the future is software-defined radio
(hereinafter "SDR") 262
While SDR is still in its developmental stages,2 1
33
both industry and the FCC recognize the poten-
tial use of the technology and are pursuing its im-
provement.2 64 It is widely recognized that SDR has
the potential to revolutionize the wireless land-
scape with its ability to conduct all functions in
software-defined units that can be altered easily by
261 From the early days of radio to today's Internet soci-
ety, Congress and the courts have continually invoked the
concept of technological change and the need to keep tip
with it as justification for their attempts to revise the law. See
PETER W. HUBER, ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAw
861-65 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter HUBER] (giving a brief
overview of the technological developments in the wireless
industry and the impact of technological advancements on
the marketplace and regulatory environment). See generally
Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological Change and
Doctrinal Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress and
the Court, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 976 (1997) [hereinafter Price &
Duffy].
262 In SDR, computer software is used to determine and
set all operating parameters, such as the frequency and mod-
ulation type. This is contrary to present systems where such
parameters are changed by physically altering the electronic
signal within the equipment hardware. As a result of this dif-
ference, SDR may be programmed to transmit and receive on
any frequency and to use any desired transmission format,
thereby allowing the user to operate in multiple radio ser-
vices and according to varying standards. Also, in contrast to
traditional radios that have their technical characteristics
fixed at the time of manufacture and cannot be easily modi-
fied, SDRs may be altered in the field by a software change.
See WHATIS?COM, SOFIWARE-DEFINED RADIO (SDR), at http://
whatis.techtarget.com (last visited June 22, 2001) (defining
SDR); see also SDR FORUM, SDR PRIMER, at http://
www.sdrforum.org/sdr primer.html (last visited June 22,
2001).
263 See FCC to Investigate Software-Defined Radio Technology,
MOBILE COMM. REP., Mar. 20, 2000 (quoting a FCC official as
saying that interference is a potential concern with SDR tech-
nology because it operates on many frequencies, thereby rais-
ing changes of interference); George Lawton, Flexible Future,
WIRELESS REV., Jan. 15, 2001 available at http://www.telecom
click.com/magazinearticle.asp?magazinearticleid=28268&
mode=print (noting that SDR has not taken off in handsets
and other mobile formats because of the difficulty in devel-
oping equipment (for example, batteries) capable of meet-
ing the size and power requirements of mobile SDR equip-
changing computer programs, rather than chang-
ing radio hardware as currently required. 265 For
example, SDR's ability to make equipment oper-
ate in different bands and according to different
standards (even simultaneously) could facilitate
the global deployment of equipment, as manufac-
turers would no longer be constrained by varying
country standards and allocations and the impos-
ing economies of scale they currently present.
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More importantly for the purposes of this inquiry,
however, SDR has tremendous potential to foster
secondary markets in spectrum.26 7 With its ability
to alleviate congestion of the spectrum by locating
unused spectrum instantaneously and dynamically
shepherding signals (in data form) along those
unused frequencies, SDR will bring dramatic effi-
ciencies in spectrum use that will open up the me-




264 In the effort to develop SDR technology, the Com-
mission has initiated a rulemaking proceeding proposing
rule changes streamlining approval procedures so carriers
will not have to resubmit applications and re-label hardware
out in the field after altering software programs in central
locations. See generally In re Authorization and Use of Software
Defined Radios, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd.
24,442 (2000) [hereinafter SDR NPRM]. The Industry has re-
sponded to the Commission's proceeding by forming a trade
group, the Software Defined Radio Forum, comprised of cor-
porations (mostly equipment manufacturers) dedicated to
promoting SDR primarily through the agency comment pro-
cess. See SDR Forum, About the Software Defined Radio Forum, at
http://www.sdrforum.org/about-index.html (last visited
Apr. 23, 2001).
265 See SD? NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd. at 24,443-44, para. 4
("The ability of software defined radios to be reprogrammed
to new operating parameters in the field could have far
reaching implications for the way the Commission allocates
and licenses spectrum and authorizes radio equipment.").
266 See, e.g., FCC Proposes Rule Changes to Facilitate Software
Defined Radio Deployment-Separate Statement of Commissioner
Susan Ness, ET Dkt. No. 00-47, FCC NEWS, Dec. 7, 2000, at 2
[hereinafter Ness' Public Statement] (noting that SDR could
foster global deployment of equipment by lowering barriers
presented by different country allocations and rules).
267 See Comments of SDR Forum to the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 00-230, at 3 (Feb. 9, 2001) [here-
inafter SDR Forum Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM] (con-
curring with Secondary Markets Policy Statement that SDR tech-
nologies will play a major role in facilitating the development
of effective secondary markets).
268 See SDR Forum Comments to Secondary Markets NPRM,
supra note 267, at 3 ("SDR technology can, in time, enable
exactly the sort of flexible, timely adjustments that will be
necessary for a leased-spectrum market to thrive."); Ness'Pub-
lic Statement NPRM, supra note 266, at 2 (stating that ability of
SDR to "operate under different parameters in different
places" provides a flexibility that may enable strong secon-
dary markets); HUBER, supra note 261, at 865 (accepting phi-
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Among the many possible consequences of SDR
on wireless markets and policy, probably the most
significant is the technical ability to create an en-
vironment where dynamic spot markets and com-
modity-like exchanges for wireless spectrum
bandwidth can develop. The FCC recognizes that
with the ability to agilely adapt to the frequency,
modulation, bandwidth and power requirements
of various service rules, SDR will engender the
requisite flexibility to allow services to travel over
multiple frequencies and allow a single frequency
to accommodate multiple services. 269 At the same
time, the Commission recognizes the need for
mechanisms that promote information sharing
and bring parties together.2 70 This technical flexi-
bility and exchange mechanism combined will en-
able licensees to more fully separate their spec-
trum use rights from their facilities to make
spectrum a truly fungible good capable of being
traded like other commodities. 27 1 Indeed, guard
band managers represent the first wave of experi-
mentation with this new model and, when cou-
pled with the secondary markets initiative, mark
the beginning of the next major shift in spectrum
policy.2 72 However, in establishing a spectrum
leasing regime based on the guard band manager
and secondary market initiatives, as presently for-
mulated, the Commission may be hindering the
development of the exchange-driven spot markets
it seeks.
B. Obstacles and Bridges to the Spectrum
Exchanges of the Future
Under the guard band manager initiative and
the Commission's leasing proposal in the Secon-
losophy that spectrum capacity is virtually infinite and only
limited by our technological ignorance).
269 Secondary Markets Policy Statement, 15 FCC Rcd. at
24,192-93, paras. 36-37.
270 Id. at 24,193-94, paras. 38-39 (proposing online list-
ing of licenses by service, frequencies and services areas, and
promoting the development of private spectrum listing ser-
vices, as well as spectrum brokers and exchanges).
271 Id. at 24,185, para. 17 (recognizing potential fungibil-
ity of spectrum and the possibility of creating spectrum ex-
changes similar to existing wireline bandwidth exchanges).
272 As discussed above, economist Eli Noam has pro-
posed that the next paradigm in spectrum policy will be the
"Open Access Paradigm." This new paradigm will be rooted
in the development of SDR technology-based exchanges that
will significantly reduce the cost of access to the spectrum.
Noam, supra note 25, at 778-81. However, Noam's plan to
bring about this new paradigm gets hung up on whether the
exchanges should be privately administered by exchanges
dary Markets NPRM, the Commission holds licen-
sees ultimately responsible for the actions of their
lessee or sublessee to accommodate the control
requirements of Section 310(d). However, in an
environment where SDR and other digital com-
munications will enable signals to be carried over
multiple frequencies with alacrity similar to IP
networking, the fiction of control currently being
enforced would take on even greater implausibil-
ity. One can imagine a scenario where a licensee
leases out spectrum through a clearinghouse for a
very short period of a time (i.e., a day, an hour or
a few minutes) without ever knowing the lessee
until well after the term of use has expired. In-
deed, this is the very kind of efficient spectrum
use the Secondary Markets NPRM claimed it hoped
to one day develop.
273
In the scenario described above, licensees
maintain virtually no real control over the leased
spectrum. Requiring licensees to maintain control
over leased spectrum would only hinder transac-
tions. Certifying that each spectrum lessee in an
SDR environment meets all eligibility require-
ments and complies with all technical and service
rules, as the second prong of the proposed stan-
dard requires, would greatly increase the adminis-
trative burden experienced in the current envi-
ronment and serve as a clear disincentive to
overall spectrum leasing. Complicated certifica-
tion and liability provisions would have to be in-
cluded in contracts between licensees and ex-
changes, as well contracts between exchanges and
lessees. Such a standard would needlessly drag a
third party (the licensee) into a compliance re-
gime that could suffice with only two parties: the
lessee and the exchange.
274
handling licensee owned spectrum, or publicly administered
by an entity holding the entire spectrum. See Thomas Hazlett,
Spectrum Flash Dance: Eli Noam's Proposal for "Open Access" to
Radio Waves, 41 J.L. & ECON. 805, 813 (1998) (noting that
Noam's proposal moves away from liberalizing licensees'
property rights and moves toward a monolithic open access
system eliminating property rights and the incentives they
create).
273 The initiation of the secondary markets proceeding
was an important project for former FCC Chairman William
Kennard. Kennard stated that the Commission must alleviate
the coming spectrum drought by creating a fluid spectrum
marketplace where spectrum and information about spec-
trum flows as freely as with any other commodity. Kennard,
supra note 5.
274 It also increases the risk of liability for all involved by




Giving licensees the authority to suspend or ter-
minate lessees' operations, as the third prong of
the proposed standard provided and the first
prong may require, may also hinder the develop-
ment of clearinghouse or exchange-based secon-
dary markets. Just as with the certification require-
ment, foisting enforcement responsibilities upon
licensees would unnecessarily complicate situa-
tions where interference must be corrected by re-
quiring them to engage in remediation efforts
with the exchange, the lessee and the Commis-
sion. Such a process and its attendant time and
expense could be spared from innocent and un-
knowing licensees by simply holding lessees re-
sponsible and keeping the Commission and possi-
bly the exchange as the primary enforcement
entities. Prospective licensees would be more in-
clined to exercise their right to transfer spectrum
under the latter scheme where that right would
be more certain. Lessees, for their part, may also
be more inclined to enter into leasing agreements
they know will be policed by objective third par-
ties, such as the Commission or an exchange.
Opponents of holding lessees responsible for
compliance in a SDR environment may cite the
guard band manager as a model for the future of
spectrum exchanges. Under such a proposal,
guard band managers would hold all the licenses
and lease the spectrum out to users. This way the
spectrum users' rights would be clearly defined by
a single entity, the guard band manager, and the
Commission could easily conduct enforcement
through the guard band manager. While such an
approach seems like a good way to reduce regula-
tory uncertainties by simplifying the process, it
reintroduces a character whose exile is at the
heart of the secondary markets initiative-the
government. In order to consolidate most licenses
with guard band managers, the Commission
would have to undertake a monumental realloca-
tion of spectrum, which it disfavors compared to
voluntary relocation because it leads to adminis-
trative cost and delay and the waste of capital in-
vestment laid out for existing and planned ser-
vices.
275 See Comments of 37 Concerned Economists to the
Notice of Proposed Ruiemakingin WT Dkt. No. 00-230, at 5 (Feb.
7, 2001) (arguing that the Commission should remove regu-
latory impediments to allow secondary markets to emerge,
rather than determine how they should develop).
276 See Hazlett, supra note 48, at 920-21.
277 DeVany defines liquidity as the "ease and speed with
Even if the Commission allowed licenses to
lapse and subsequently reallocated them under a
guard band manager exchange plan, it would still
be missing an opportunity to allow market forces
to create an exchange infinitely more efficient.
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By creating too many or too few exchanges or ex-
changes with too much or too little spectrum, the
Commission could overheat or depress competi-
tion. By allowing secondary markets and SDR-
driven exchanges to develop naturally, the Com-
mission could address eventual market failures af-
ter a more complete and accurate picture of the
market emerged. Finally, by centralizing license
holders, the Commission runs the risk of recreat-
ing the rent-seeking behavior Hazlett finds exhib-
ited by broadcasters-they give up certain user
rights in exchange for exclusive control of the
spectrum and protection from competition.
276
A liberalized environment where exchanges
compete for the business of licensees and lessees
by continuously striving to provide better services
and lower rates would be preferable to the re-
gimes described above. However, several things
must happen to help make this possible. First,
Congress and the Commission must get beyond
the legal fiction of control imposed by Section
310(d). Short of amending the Communications
Act to eliminate the control standard, forbear-
ance from this provision is the best method of
achieving this end. By forbearing from enforcing
Section 310(d), the Commission may reestablish
the connection between responsibility and con-
trol by placing the regulatory burden on the party
or parties overseeing the operating parameters of
the spectrum (that is lessees and exchanges, the
most likely groups to engage in misuse and the
best situated groups to remedy conflicts). Para-
doxically, reestablishing the connection between
responsibility and control will sever the link be-
tween the spectrum and facilities used in its em-
ployment; thereby, freeing spectrum users from
unproductive regulatory restraints and uncer-
tainty, while increasing the value of the spectrum
at the same time.2 77 This occurrence will prove
only more valuable, as actual control of spectrum
which an asset may be bought or sold." DeVany, supra note
19, at 633. He also notes that when spectrum is linked with
an "asset dedicated solely to producing a specific product, its
liquidity is impaired." Id. The uncoupling of the spectrum
and the facilities, via abandonment of the control standard,
directly increases spectrum's liquidity and, in turn, its value.
Id.
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is further separated from the licensee in the ad-
vanced network of exchanges SDR promises.
278
Since forbearance is better suited to promote
secondary markets than continued enforcement
of Section 310(d), it should also be extended to
non-telecommunications spectrum uses, particu-
larly broadcast. For this to occur, the Communica-
tions Act must be amended to provide broadcast
services with a corresponding provision to Section
10(a). Only when all frequencies may be freely
alienated will sufficient versatility exist to enable
the technology-driven market of the near future
to determine how a single piece of the spectrum
can be put to its highest valued use. 279 In addi-
tion, adoption of forbearance for broadcast ser-
vices would eliminate a regulatory asymmetry anti-
thetical to the intent of the Communications Act,
and which stands as an artificial barrier to the
spectrum versatility necessary for unencumbered
spectrum markets to evolve. 28
0
VI. CONCLUSION
The U.S. telecommunications industry is faced
with the possibility of "spectrum drought" that
could significantly retard the development of the
industry and the overall economy. The Commis-
sion's secondary markets initiative is a positive
step in the process of clarifying spectrum users'
278 In a dynamic field such as communications, it is criti-
cal to provide for continuous flexibility in allowing resources
to be put to changing uses. Robinson, supra note 10, at 620
279 See generally supra note 277.
280 In passing the Telecom. Act, one of Congress' pri-
mary intentions was to eliminate the differences in how com-
peting technologies are regulated. By treating similar but
technologically varying services different (television viewers
essentially don't know or care whether their program was at
some point carried to them by cable or broadcast), Congress
recognized regulation creates disruptions in the marketplace
rights and creating a more market based system
where currently encumbered spectrum can be lib-
erated by more efficient utilization practices.
However, the Commission's spectrum leasing pro-
posal clings too closely to the Commission's past
of administrative control over spectrum by contin-
uing to insist that licensees be held responsible
for their assigned spectrum, even though they do
not maintain operational control. Propagating
this legal fiction will serve as a disincentive to par-
ties seeking to enter into leasing arrangements,
especially licensees who hold the most valuable va-
riable in the equation-the spectrum license.
These disincentives will only intensify, as new digi-
tal communications technologies increase the
ease with which spectrum can be shared among
many users. The Commission should take the two
steps of forbearing from enforcing the economi-
cally and politically outdated control standards of
the past and assigning responsibility over the spec-
trum to the entity operating over the medium to
minimize the disincentives to spectrum leasing,
particularly in the technologically flexible wireless
markets of the future. Such steps would reintro-
duce the regulatory certainty necessary for parties
to create strong secondary markets and begin to
reassemble the bundle of rights spectrum once
held.
by unfairly favoring one market participant over another.
While Congress' efforts have not always resulted in the elimi-
nation of this asymmetrical regulation, their stated intent is
still clear. See Mobile Services Fourth Report & Order, 9 FCC Rcd.
at 7123-24, paras. 3-4 (describing symmetrical regulatory
framework as part of congressional goal to allow market
forces to shape the CMRS market, rather than regulation);
see also Price & Duffy, supra note 261, at 976 (noting Con-
gress' desire to "no longer [regulate] in a piecemeal, media-
specific fashion, but rather as part of a unified, coherent
scheme").
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